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JUDGING OFFENSIVENESS: A RUBRIC FOR
PRIVACY TORTS*
PATRICIA SÁNCHEZ ABRIL** & ALISSA DEL RIEGO***
How do we judge whether a violation of someone’s privacy is offensive?
Currently, U.S. tort law requires privacy violations be “highly offensive to a
reasonable person” to afford redress. However, our research reveals that there is
no effective analysis—or rhyme or reason—to determine what conduct,
disclosure, or implication is offensive. Our review of hundreds of privacy tort
cases concludes that the ambiguity of the offensiveness prong has created
opportunity for both significant legal errors and thriving biases, which often lead
to discriminatory and neglectful treatment of women, racial minorities, and
other marginalized groups. This is particularly alarming because the
offensiveness analysis figures prominently in not only the most consequential
privacy-related cases of our day, including data collection, geolocation tracking,
revenge porn, sexual harassment, and transgender bathroom access, but also in
corporate boardrooms, universities and schools, and policymaking bodies.
This Article argues that we must develop a systematic mechanism to judge
offensiveness, if the concept is to continue as a gatekeeper for privacy violations.
Despite the concept’s social significance and pervasiveness, alarmingly few legal
scholars have written about offensiveness vis-à-vis privacy and its effects in
entrenching social privilege and questionable norms. This Article seeks to fill this
gap in privacy law with a view towards informing legal reform (including the
upcoming Restatement (Third) of Torts) and providing guidelines for an
unbiased analysis for judges and other decision-makers who must increasingly
decide whether an alleged invasion of privacy is offensive. Guided by social
science and philosophy, the Article proposes a factor-based rubric to guide
decision-makers in determining whether conduct or content is highly offensive in
the privacy context.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is not events that disturb people, it is their judgements concerning
them.”1
A divorcing husband peeps through his ex’s bedroom window to
photograph her intimate moment with her lover.2 A professor lies to obtain a
student’s HIV test.3 Professional associates blast emails calling a colleague a
racist, sexual predator, and monster.4 Protesters display large signs outing the
names of women about to undergo an abortion.5 A company obtains a former
employee’s Facebook password to surveil him.6 Coworkers invade a Black
employee’s workspace to leave a menacing noose.7 An app surreptitiously
collects personal information from children.8 Victims of these transgressions
cannot find redress in U.S. privacy law unless a judge and jury legitimize their
offensiveness, that is, assess them to be “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”9
Offense and offensiveness are at the heart of most privacy violations. In
fact, it was the visceral feelings of offense felt by two notable jurists—Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren—that can be said to have inspired the creation of
privacy torts.10 In response to the privacy invasions of the day, their impactful
law review article aired their outrage, discussing the “overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”11 But rooting privacy
torts in a feeling as obvious yet nebulous as offense provides as many questions
as it does answers. What is offensiveness in privacy? How should we gauge it? The
approaches and answers to these questions have profound ramifications for
privacy and the evolving norms surrounding it.

1. EPICTETUS, DISCOURSES AND SELECTED WRITINGS (Robert Dobbin ed. & trans., Penguin
Books 2008) (n.d.).
2. Plaxico v. Michael, 96-CA-00791-SCT (¶ 8), 735 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1999) (en banc).
3. Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Colo. App. 1998).
4. Conejo v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, 377 F. Supp. 3d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2019).
5. Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
6. Decoursey v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 19-02198-DDC-GEB, 2020 WL 1812266, at *2 (D.
Kan. Apr. 9, 2020).
7. Powell v. Verizon, No. 19-8418 (KM) (MAH), 2019 WL 4597575, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20,
2019).
8. McDonald v. Kiloo APS, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1029–30 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT]. Because it does not include an offensiveness element, the
fourth privacy tort—appropriation of name or likeness—is not discussed in this Article. Id. § 652C.
10. Curiously, Warren and Brandeis’s seminal article did not use the term “offensiveness” in
discussing privacy and invasions of the same. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
11. Id. at 196.
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Generally, offense has been described as a “moralized [bad] feeling”
encompassing a wide range of diverse emotions, from simple distaste and
annoyance, to disgust, fear, and indignation.12 In daily life, the “I-know-itwhen-I-feel-it” response to things that offend or disgust is instinctual and
commonplace.13 Anything can be offensive to someone, somewhere. There is no
need for something to be objectively offensive for someone to be offended or
genuinely believe that something is offensive.14 Offense can be mistaken,
unreasonable, hypersensitive, or even immoral—and still be desperately felt. As
one scholar put it, “[A]nything you choose to do might exasperate me.”15
Culturally, the concept of offensiveness is having a moment. Labeling
something as offensive has become an empowering and sometimes controversial
rallying cry. Examples abound in contemporary “cancel culture,” which is
marked by communal calls to boycott public figures and organizations for
offensive behavior, often based on racism or misogyny.16 Studies suggest that
people today perceive others to be more likely to take offense and voice it,
prompting debates on the chilling nature of the label.17
Even though it is obvious when felt and pervasive in social discourse,
offensiveness in privacy tort law is a concept in crisis—and this crisis can have
profound ramifications for determining who is entitled to privacy protection.
Privacy invasions are intensely context-specific, often complex, potentially
subjective, and reliant on surrounding norms. Three privacy torts—intrusion

12. ANDREW SNEDDON, OFFENSE AND OFFENSIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT 44
(2021).
13. See DEBRA LIEBERMAN & CARLTON PATRICK, OBJECTION: DISGUST, MORALITY AND
THE LAW 14 (2018) (“[P]eople routinely make decisions based on their ‘gut,’ they ‘listen to their heart,’
and they act on their ‘feelings’—often without any ability to account for how or why those intuitions
were produced.”).
14. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 26.
15. Andrew von Hirsch, Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offense to
Others, 84 MICH. L. REV. 700, 709 (1986) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Injury].
16. Kelly Sadler, Top 10 Recent Examples of Cancel Culture, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/feb/16/top-10-recent-examples-cancel-culture/ [https
://perma.cc/9U7Z-VP22]; Pippa Norris, Cancel Culture: Myth or Reality?, POL. STUD., Aug. 11, 2021,
at 1, 2. See generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, CANCEL CULTURE: THE LATEST ATTACK ON FREE
SPEECH AND DUE PROCESS (2020) (discussing cancel culture’s potential effects on democracy and
due process).
17. See, e.g., Emily Ekins, Poll: 62% of Americans Say They Have Political Views They’re Afraid To
Share, CATO INST. (July 22, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/poll-62americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share [https://perma.cc/DQS9-K3QK (staffuploaded archive)]; PEW RSCH. CTR., PUBLIC HIGHLY CRITICAL OF STATE OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE IN THE U.S.: REACTIONS TO TRUMP’S RHETORIC: CONCERN, CONFUSION,
EMBARRASSMENT 68 (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/
2019/06/PP_2019.06.19_Political-Discourse_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/39N2-XCQB]; Jennifer
Harper, 81% of Americans Say People Are Too Easily Offended These Days, WASH. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/apr/27/81-of-americans-say-people-are-tooeasily-offended/ [https://perma.cc/W7X3-NFPV (staff-uploaded archive)].
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upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light—require an
action that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”18 This requirement acts
as a gatekeeping element, offering a tempering moment for judicial discretion
and community context-reading.
And yet, offensiveness has often eluded courts. The concept has proven
slippery—visceral, expansive, potentially biased, and thus rarely dissected
systematically. As a result, courts often forgo its reasoned analysis, apply
inconsistent (or no) standards, and harbor contradictions. At a minimum,
offensiveness is a reflection of social convention19 or, as one court puzzlingly
put it, an “objectively-based threshold degree of repugnance.”20 Other courts
have looked to the harm caused or invoked by public policy.21 In short, we seem
to lack the analytical vocabulary and framework to nail offensiveness beyond
vague statements.
Analytical failures threaten both over-inclusion and under-inclusion.22 An
overinclusive offensiveness standard risks overly imposing moralism and
validating irrational sensitivities and idiosyncrasies, undermining the role of law
and chilling speech and action.23 When the offensiveness standard, conversely,
becomes too high a bar, too inflexible, or too outdated to accommodate
contemporary invasions of privacy, it risks under-inclusion. This could lead to
an entrenchment of existing social hierarchies, a perpetuation of biases, a
misreading of evolving social or technology norms—and a gutting of the privacy
torts.
As Justice Stevens observed, when he was in high school in the 1930s, Gone
with the Wind’s famous “[f]rankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn” line shocked
the nation, but half a century later, it was not so offensive.24 Today, our society
is undergoing a shift in mores at a faster pace than ever. The legalization of
marijuana and same-sex marriage, as well as the increased awareness about
systemic racism and misogyny brought about by Black Lives Matter and
18. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E(a).
19. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10(A)(2) (1993).
20. Fabio v. Credit Bureau of Hutchinson, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 688, 692 (D. Minn. 2002).
21. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 606 (9th Cir. 2020).
22. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1711, 1764 (2010); Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious
and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263, 1267–84 (1993); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming
Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1810, 1830, 1850–51 (2010); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing
Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV.
989, 1057–76 (1995); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 961–63 (1989); cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double
Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2068 (2018) (noting that at least 12% of public-disclosure-ofprivate-facts cases between 2006 and 2016 were dismissed because the court found disclosure was not
highly offensive).
23. See, e.g., J. Angelo Corlett, Offensiphobia, 22 J. ETHICS 113, 115 (2018).
24. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 691 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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#MeToo movements are some important examples of the rapid shift in societal
consciousness. Technological innovations complicate the matter, creating new
ways of communicating and doing business along with emerging associated
norms for acceptable conduct. Recently, the issue of offensiveness has figured
in privacy tort cases involving some of the most consequential privacy-related
issues of our day, including data collection,25 geolocation tracking,26 revenge
porn,27 sexual harassment,28 and transgender bathroom access.29
Fuzzy logic and inchoate reasoning on offensiveness are too costly for
privacy and society, permitting covert and unacknowledged biases to discretely
(or in some cases overtly) seep through in determining offensiveness. The
biases espoused by courts, several scholars have observed, often lead to
discriminatory treatment of women, racial minorities, and other marginalized
groups in tort law.30 And decisions that hold as a matter of law that no
reasonable person would find the conduct or disclosure at issue to be offensive
stigmatize dissenters as unreasonable outcasts unworthy of consideration.31
This Article proposes to organize the opaque, chaotic analysis of
offensiveness by exposing its analytical and doctrinal inconsistencies and
drawing principles from other disciplines (most notably philosophy) to create
order. In Part I of this Article, we explore the current state of the offensiveness
analysis in privacy torts, studying its approaches and challenges as manifest
through decades of case law and scholarship. We join the chorus of privacy
scholars and courts who have criticized the loose and unpredictable approaches
25. See, e.g., Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 111 (W.D. Pa. 2019);
Manigault-Johnson v. Google, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-1032-BHH, 2019 WL 3006646, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar.
31, 2019); Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
26. See, e.g., In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 809–12 (N.D. Cal. 2020);
In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
27. See, e.g., Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835 (E.D. Mich. 2011); People v. Bollaert,
248 Cal. App. 4th 699, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
28. See, e.g., Aguinaga v. Sanmina Corp., No. 3:97-CV-1026-G, 1998 WL 241260, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. May 4, 1998); Pearson v. Kancilia, 70 P.3d 594, 596 (Colo. App. 2003).
29. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 2018).
30. See, e.g., SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 1 (2021); Taunya Lovell
Banks, Teaching Laws with Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic Approach to Torts, 57 MISS. L. REV. 443, 444–46
(1992); Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 575 (1993);
Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1436–37 (2005); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 463–66 (1998) [hereinafter Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias];
Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2115, 2115–16 (2007) [hereinafter Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage]; Dan M.
Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841–42 (2009); Lisa R. Pruitt, “On the
Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends”: Injury from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century,
78 IND. L.J. 965, 972 (2003).
31. Kahan et al., supra note 30, at 887.
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to determining offensiveness,32 but we go a step further. Having qualitatively
surveyed hundreds of relevant privacy tort cases, we identify and diagnose
critical traps courts face when applying the “highly offensive” prong, including
misidentifying the offense, mis-framing the offense, and potentially fatal or
biased misapplications of the law. It is clear that the effects of these errors in
judgment and application have significant ramifications, often determinative of
who is entitled to privacy.
Part II takes a broader view, incorporating definitions, concepts, and
examples from psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science to give
infrastructure to offensiveness. Leading legal scholars and philosophers have
long debated the roles of norms and emotions in law.33 Informed by seminal
works in philosophy,34 we expose various prominent lenses and tests through
which to understand offensiveness in law. As the real-life analytical traps
converge with lessons from philosophy, a clearer picture begins to emerge
regarding the factors relevant to assess offensiveness more objectively and
fairly.
Ultimately, Part III proposes a rubric to guide the offensiveness analysis
in privacy torts. The framework analyzes the offensiveness of the privacy
violation by listing seven relevant factors that anyone assessing offensiveness
should keep in mind to avoid error and bias. Our proposed test rejects simple
32. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC (HL) 457, [¶ 22] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK); Austl Broad Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, ¶ 42
(Austl.); Cavico, supra note 22, at 1267–84; McClurg, supra note 22, at 1057–76; N.A. Moreham,
Abandoning the “High Offensiveness” Privacy Test, 4 CANADIAN J. COMPAR. & CONTEMP. L. 161, 161
(2018).
33. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) (questioning how principles of
harm and offense should be understood and applied); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
47 (1963) (“No social order which accords to individual liberty any value could also accord the right to
be protected from distress thus occasioned. Protection from shock or offence to feelings caused by some
public display is, as most legal systems recognise, another matter.”); Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive
Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 63, 63 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (discussing role
of disgust in the law and how accounts of disgust are typically “found in socially conservative defenses
of public morals offenses”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale University Press 2003) (1859) (articulating the famous philosophical tenet known as the
“harm principle,” or the idea that the mere offense is not enough to justify government intervention);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY] (critiquing the role that shame and disgust play
in the law); Martha C. Nussbaum, Secret Sewers of Vice: Disgust, Bodies and the Law, in PASSIONS OF
LAW 44 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Secret Sewers] (arguing that disgust has
no legal relevance); Tatjana Hörnle, Offensive Behavior and German Penal Law, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
255 (2001) (applying Feinberg’s model of offense to German penal theory); von Hirsch, Injury, supra
note 15 (analyzing Feinberg’s definitions of “harm” and “offense” and articulating underlying rationales
for these definitions).
34. See generally SNEDDON, supra note 12 (exploring the nature of offense); NUSSBAUM, HIDING
FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33 (analyzing the complex relationship between offense and disgust);
FEINBERG, supra note 33 (exploring the distinction between the offense, profound offense, and
obscene).
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moralistic conclusions in favor of an emphasis on the wisdom of the crowd and
transparency of reasoning. It strives to make explicit the anatomy of the offense
to lay bare its sources and identify the interests impinged, while prompting the
arbiter to consider contextual factors and avoid cognitive biases. The goal is not
to sway the analysis substantively—that is, to render outcomes more, or less,
offensive—but rather to organize and guide its process. We then apply this
rubric to three case examples to illustrate the resulting analysis. Part IV
concludes.
At the outset, it is helpful to define some terms. We refer to the source of
the offense as the trigger. The trigger is different depending on the privacy tort
alleged. It can be conduct (in intrusion claims), content (disclosure claims), or
implication (false light claims). The offense is the aggrieved party’s reaction to
the trigger. The law provides that the offense must be reasonable. Offensiveness
refers to the degree of the offense, including a judgment on whether offense is
warranted.
Tackling offensiveness is a daunting and ambitious project. However,
given the relatively scant scholarly attention focused on offensiveness and
privacy,35 ignoring it is too costly for privacy and society. Today, it is not only
judges and juries engaging in consequential analyses of offensiveness.
Policymakers, businesses, universities and schools, journalists, and just about
every individual benefit from learning how to think about offensiveness in a
structured manner. The significance of a written, guided rubric for decisionmakers cannot be understated. Daniel Kahneman, Oliver Sibony, and Cass
Sunstein have compellingly shown that like bias, noise, or inconsistent,
unexplained variations in judgments, cause significant errors and undermine
justice.36 These authors propose that guidelines can reduce the ill effects of
noise. In the same vein, this Article describes and deconstructs the judgment
errors—both noise and bias—present in the offensiveness analysis and
prescribes guidelines for decision-makers. So, our objective is vital but
realistically modest: to examine the doctrinal, theoretical, and practical realities
of offensiveness today in order to extract propositions suitable to guide
decision-makers in the privacy realm.

35. Most privacy scholars have, at one time or another, commented in passing of the elusive
nature of the standard and its potential to set the recovery bar too high for victims of privacy invasions.
However, to date, in-depth treatment has been limited. See McClurg, supra note 22, at 995–96;
Moreham, supra note 32, at 169–72; Post, supra note 22, at 965–68; Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting
Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40–44 (2007).
36. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, OLIVIER SIBONY & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NOISE: A FLAW IN HUMAN
JUDGMENT 3–5 (2021).
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I. “OFFENSIVENESS” IN THE PRIVACY TORTS
Offensiveness is an element of three of the four privacy torts—intrusion
upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light publicity.37 All
three torts require that the core of the privacy invasion—that is, the intrusion,
the matter disclosed, or the false light—be highly offensive.38 Although an
offended state may have inspired Warren and Brandeis’s seminal article,39 and
thus the creation of the torts, it was William Prosser’s later developments that
introduced offensiveness as a requisite element.40 In his 1960 California Law
Review article, Prosser explained that to be actionable, the core of the privacy
violations “must be something which would be offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable man.”41 Between Prosser’s article and the 1977 Restatement, the
offensiveness standard rose from offensive to highly offensive42—perhaps as an
apologetic compromise that ensured the newly developed torts would not
encompass a wide sea of conduct and disclosures. Indeed, as a practical matter,
the objective offensiveness standard acts as a gatekeeper against redress for
“accidental, misguided, or excusable acts.”43 There is, however, no bright-line
test for offensiveness.44 It is instead a fact-intensive, context-specific analysis.

37. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E(a).
38. It bears noting that although the offensiveness standard is the same, the subject of each
analysis is different in the three torts. In an intrusion claim, the actual intrusion must be highly
offensive. Id. § 652B. In a public-disclosure-of-private-facts claim, the private matter publicized must
be highly offensive. Id. § 652D. And in false-light-publicity claims, the false light in which the plaintiff
is placed must be highly offensive. Id. § 652E. For ease of reference, we will refer to these as the cores
of the privacy violations.
39. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 195–97; Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 295 (1983)
(observing Warren and Brandeis’s primary standard to have been the personal tastes and preferences
of the individual plaintiff, and they, therefore, did not require that the actionable information be
especially intimate, or particularly offensive by objective standards).
40. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 396–97 (1960).
41. Id. at 390–91 (describing intrusion); id. at 396 (using the same language to describe the
offensiveness of the matter disclosed in public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort); id. at 400 (“The false
light . . . must be something that would be objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the
circumstances.”).
42. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E(a).
43. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 150 (3d Cir. 2015);
see also Kleiman v. Equable Ascent, No. CV 12-9729 CAS AJWx, 2013 WL 49754, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647–48 (Cal. 1994)); Post,
supra note 22, at 961, 975, 984 (noting the “highly offensive” requirement of the Restatement is meant
to limit the redress of privacy to only those transgressions that go beyond the limits of decency); Robert
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-volution for
American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 101 (2008) (describing the highly offensive standard
as a significant limitation on the torts).
44. Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are
Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1006 (2011).
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Legal Standards on Offensiveness

Since its inception, the offensiveness analysis has been consistently
muddled. Like privacy itself, “nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it
[means].”45 Instead of an appeal to reason, we are engulfed by instinctual
conclusions in a “knee-jerk form: ‘That violates my privacy’”46 or “that’s
offensive!” But legally determining offensiveness, as courts and juries must, is
an abstruse task made more difficult in a diverse, pluralistic, and rapidly
evolving society.
Despite its difficulty, offensiveness appears prominently—and often
confoundingly—in many areas of law, from criminal law (which penalizes
morally offensive conduct like prostitution and indecent exposure) to First
Amendment inquiries, including obscenity, indecency, school speech, and
freedom of religion.47 The analysis of the concept is central to some causes of
action, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires
plaintiffs to show that harassment was both objectively and subjectively
offensive.48 Other areas of law, such as trademark law49 and the
Communications Decency Act,50 have witnessed offensiveness fall out of favor
as a barometer of rectitude.

45. Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION OF PRIVACY:
AN ANTHOLOGY 272 (Ferdinand David Shoeman ed., 1984); Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy].
46. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 45, at 480.
47. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098–103 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.
concurring) (discussing offended observer standing in First Amendment Establishment Clause cases);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (permitting schools to regulate plainly
offensive speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1978) (applying FCC’s definition
of indecent speech as speech or language that “describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs”); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (applying the patently offensive standard in
obscenity cases); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (noting the First Amendment protections
for offensive speech).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (1964) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012).
49. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
50. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in 47 U.S.C.
§§ 230, 560–61). Recent proposed amendments to § 230 of the Communications Decency Act seek to
either eliminate or clarify the Act’s immunity protection for service provider’s removal of “offensive
material.” See, e.g., Stop the Censorship Act of 2020, H.R. 7808, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020); Stop
the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act, S.
4534, 116th Cong. (2020); see also DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230—NURTURING INNOVATION OR
FOSTERING UNACCOUNTABILITY? 11–25 (2020) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230
NURTURING], https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=go
vdelivery [https://perma.cc/82AF-4U6A].
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In privacy tort cases, courts often engage in these high-stakes inquiries by
deciding offensiveness as a matter of law.51 Courts must first determine whether
a reasonable person could find the privacy violation to be highly offensive.52 If
the court does determine that a reasonable person could find the violation highly
offensive, a factfinder then determines whether a reasonable person would find
it highly offensive.53
To come to these conclusions, courts must ignore the subjective factors to
which one would customarily appeal when assessing whether something is
colloquially offensive: the views of the aggrieved and the harms caused. Unlike
other areas of law where the subjective impressions of the aggrieved are
considered (such as hostile work environment claims54 and now-defunct § 2(a)
of the Lanham Act disallowing disparaging or immoral trademarks55), the highly
offensive standard is meant to be purely objective,56 asking not whether the
aggrieved suffered offense, but rather how the reasonable person—a construct
embodying the norms and “moral judgment of the community”57—would react.
The offensiveness inquiry thus is not meant to predict actual human emotion
caused by offensive conduct or content, but rather to identify those norms that,
when violated, would appropriately cause outrage in reasonable individuals.58
The tort also eschews harm. A privacy harm results from the offense
provoked by the invasion, not the actual mental suffering or humiliation it
causes the plaintiff.59 Thus while the observable harm caused to the plaintiff can
51. McClurg, supra note 22, at 999–1005 (noting, referring to empirical data from 1992, courts’
judicial animus for privacy tort cases and their propensity to decide elements of the tort as a matter of
law, rather than allowing them to go to the jury, particularly the factual issue of whether the conduct
or disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person).
52. Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010); Polansky v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
75 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App. 2002); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); see also June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: A New Intrusion Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 965, 992 (2001); Rebecca L. Scharf, Drone Invasion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Right to
Privacy, 94 IND. L.J. 1065, 194–95 (2019).
53. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1234 (7th Cir. 1993) (public disclosure
of private facts); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1984) (false light); Swarthout v. Mut.
Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (intrusion upon seclusion).
54. Under Title VII, for harassment to be actionable it “must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact
did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).
55. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 428–29 (1946) (repealed); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1751 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
56. But see Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality:
Re-thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 119, 128–29 (2003) (arguing
highly offensive element in privacy torts is actually a subjective judgment determined by the mores of
a specific community).
57. Post, supra note 22, at 961 (quoting FOWLER HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW
OF TORTS § 16.2 (1956)); see also id. (“[T]he reasonable person is only a generic construct without real
emotions.”).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 960–61.
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be an indicator of the type of invasion that might be offensive, it is not
determinative of the offensiveness of the invasion.
How do courts do this? Over a century has now passed since the inception
of the privacy torts and half a century since the Restatement’s introduction of
the offensiveness standard. Throughout that time, courts have developed
various ways of approaching offensiveness.
B.

Current Approaches to Analyzing Offensiveness

This section discusses the different approaches courts have employed to
assess offensiveness. These include mores-based inquiries, categorizing certain
conduct or content as necessarily offensive, applying factor-based tests, focusing
on the outrage produced by the trigger, and less targeted approaches that resort
to descriptors or unexplained findings of offensiveness.
1. Mores-Based Inquiries
The most common approach in assessing offensiveness is a simple look to
community mores, rules of civility, and social norms. In his seminal article,
Prosser posited that privacy torts’ offensiveness standard necessarily implies “a
‘mores’ test.”60 Courts applying a mores test have held that liability only
attaches when privacy invasions defy the tolerable bounds of the “ordinary
views of the community.”61 Courts have also held that such liability attaches
when privacy invasions shock the “community’s notions of decency.”62 This
requires an often instinctual examination of the community’s social conventions
and expectations63 and a subsequent determination regarding whether the
violation was an egregious breach of those established social norms.64

60. Prosser, supra note 40, at 400.
61. See id. at 397 (interpreting Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1938),
aff’d, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)).
62. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; see also Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (“It is
only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.”); Sipple v.
Chron. Publ’g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1048–49 (1984) (“In determining what is a matter of
legitimate public interest, account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community;
and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores.”).
63. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 606 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied sub nom. Facebook, Inc. v. Davis, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021); Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp.
3d 1064, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (looking to whether the conduct is “consistent with community notions
of privacy as they existed at the time”); PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev.
1995) (“The question of what kinds of conduct will be regarded as a ‘highly offensive’ intrusion is
largely a matter of social conventions and expectations.” (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 19,
§ 5.10(A)(1))), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v.
Hecht, 940 P.2d 134 (Nev. 1997).
64. See, e.g., In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Carter v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Hernandez v. Hillsides,
Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009).
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2. Offensiveness Per Se
Some courts in privacy tort cases seem to take the narrow view of themes
that can rise to the level of offensiveness. In public disclosure cases, for example,
a few courts have limited highly offensive matters to those that are also highly
personal, involving health problems, sexual relationships, and family quarrels.65
While courts in intrusion cases have not similarly limited the areas upon which
intrusions can be highly offensive, they have found the element more likely to
be met when the intrusion involves a person’s physical home or intimate
conduct.66
While helpful to the analysis of those narrow classes of cases, the offense
per se approach is highly restrictive, prohibiting the expansion or interpretation
of novel behavior as offensive if it does not intrude into personal or physical
space.67
3. Factor-Based Tests
Courts, most notably California courts, have identified factors and
proposed balancing tests to determine offensiveness. The leading test on
offensiveness was established in Miller v. National Broadcasting Company.68 The
California appellate court listed five factors courts should consider when
determining whether an intrusion meets the tort’s highly offensive standard:
(1) “the degree of intrusion,” (2) “the context, conduct, and circumstances
surrounding the intrusion,” (3) “the intruder’s motives and objectives,” (4) “the
65. See, e.g., Paige v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 818 F. Supp. 2d 4, 17 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that
“‘highly offensive’ matters generally relate to the intimate details of a person’s life, sexual relations,
and other personal matters” and video of DEA officer accidentally shooting himself in the leg was
embarrassing but not highly offensive because it did not relate to an intimate detail of his private life
or his sexual affairs); Karraker v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683–84 (C.D. Ill. 2004), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 411 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that public discussion of the
results of a plaintiff’s psychological test, namely that plaintiff should drink more water, cut down on
caffeine and nicotine, and be less high strung was “innocuous” and not highly offensive because it was
not “exceedingly personal,” unlike “discussions about sexual practices”).
66. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206
A.2d 239, 241–42 (N.H. 1964); see also Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the Challenges of Protecting
Employee Privacy Under U.S. Law, 40 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 405, 412–13 (2019) (noting courts are
more likely to find conduct offensive where employer surveils or searches areas that impinge on bodily
privacy or investigate employees’ sex lives, health problems, or workplace bathrooms); David
Libardoni, Prisoners of Fame: How Expanded Use of Intrusion Upon Psychological Seclusion Can Protect the
Privacy of Former Public Figures, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2013) (noting plaintiffs’
lack of difficulty in proving intrusions into bathrooms, homes, and mail are highly offensive); Solove,
Taxonomy, supra note 45, at 555 (noting that “[g]enerally, courts recognize intrusion upon seclusion tort
actions only when a person is at home or in a secluded place”); Post, supra note 22, at 960 (observing
“[m]arital bedrooms” are “sacred precincts” in privacy torts regardless of harm that can be deciphered
as a result of the invasion (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 485 (1965))).
67. Sánchez Abril, supra note 35, at 21 (noting that interpreting the Restatement’s static list of
highly offensive conduct as exhaustive “significantly limit[s] the public disclosure tort’s application”).
68. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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setting into which [the intrusion occurs],” and (5) “the expectations of those
whose privacy is invaded.”69 Miller has been adopted across other jurisdictions70
and has been used across privacy torts as a gauge of offensiveness.71
In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,72 the California Supreme
Court observed, prior to applying Miller, that the objective offensiveness
analysis involved consideration of (1) the likelihood of serious harm,
particularly to the emotional sensibilities of the plaintiff, against (2) any
countervailing interests based on competing social norms that may render the
defendant’s conduct inoffensive, such as a legitimate public interest in exposing
serious crime or, in that case, the NCAA’s interest in restricting the use of
controlled substances in college sports.73 Then, in 2009, the California Supreme
Court seemingly combined the balancing tests from both Hill and Miller in
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.74 by weighing (1) the degree and setting of the
intrusion, which includes the place, time, and scope of the defendant’s intrusion,
against (2) the defendants’ motives, justifications, and related issues.75
4. Focus on Outrage
Some jurisdictions opt to assess whether the privacy violation meets the
standard of the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort, which conflates
a normative analysis with a high level of outrage and intent. The standard limits
findings of offensiveness to intrusions “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.”76 In these
jurisdictions, only intrusions that are done “in such a manner as to outrage or
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary
69. Id. at 679.
70. See, e.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2013); Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit
Corp., 459 P.3d 253, 260 (Or. Ct. App. 2020); Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d
374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
71. Vasquez v. Trinity Mission Health, No. 2:11–CV–01002–EJF, 2013 WL 4095157, at *20 (D.
Utah Aug. 13, 2013) (applying Miller to false light claim); cf. Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413
F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (using Miller to discuss offensiveness prong of plaintiff’s public
disclosure of private facts claim).
72. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
73. Id. at 647–48.
74. 211 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2009).
75. Id. at 1072.
76. Stoddard v. Wohlfahrt, 573 So. 2d 1060, 1062–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Ponton
v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)); see also Hammer v. Sorensen, 824 F.
App’x 689, 696 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Stoddard, 573 So. 2d at 1062–63)) (holding that the conduct
would not be “highly offensive to a reasonable person, as Florida law construes that phrase,” because
“Florida law equates the ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ element from the intrusion-uponseclusion cause of action with the ‘outrageousness’ element of the intentional-infliction-of-emotionaldistress cause of action”); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (“It is only where
the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.”); Haller v. Phillips, 591
N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that intrusion must be of “such a character as would
shock the ordinary person to the point of emotional distress”).
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sensibilities”77 meet the highly offensive standard. Other courts similarly
require a privacy violation to be “so outrageous that the traditional remedies of
trespass, nuisance, intentional infliction of mental distress, etc., will not
adequately compensate a plaintiff for the insult to his individual dignity.”78 A
few courts in false-light cases have also required the false light to be of the kind
that would cause the reasonable person to “suffer outrage, mental distress,
shame, and humiliation.”79 These are, unsurprisingly, “very high standard[s].”80
5. Non-approach Approaches
In the absence of a test or other source of agreed-upon enlightenment,
many jurisdictions opt to assess the trigger with varying descriptors of
offensiveness. Some of these reference generalized norms, such as “utterly
intolerable,”81 “beyond all possible bounds of decency,”82 and “egregious breach
of . . . social norms.”83 Others evoke a moral judgment, such as
“objectionable,”84 “strongly object[ionable],”85 “atrocious and utterly
intolerable,”86 “shock[ing] the conscience,”87 and “extreme in degree.”88 A third
grouping distinguishes characteristics of the violations, like “unwarranted,”89
“highly obtrusive,”90 and “repeated with such persistence and frequency as to
amount to a course of hounding.”91 Still, others reference the consequences of
the violation, such as causing “mental anguish and suffering,”92 “humiliation or

77. Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 122 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
78. Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 998 (Kan. 1973) (Fromme, J., dissenting); see also Douglass
v. Hustler Mag., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The false-light tort, to the extent distinct from
the tort of defamation . . . rests on an awareness that people who are made to seem pathetic or ridiculous
may be shunned, and not just people who are thought to be dishonest or incompetent or immoral.”).
79. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974).
80. Martin v. Guevara, 464 F. App’x 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2012).
81. McIsaac v. WZEW–FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986).
82. Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Rowell v. King,
No. 05-1078, 2005 WL 2099718, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2005).
83. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 601–02 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 2009)).
84. Prosser, supra note 40, at 391.
85. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652B, cmt. d.
86. Harrison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 17-61164-CIV, 2018 WL 9516029, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 21, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Davidson Hotel Co., LLC, 806 F. App’x 684 (11th Cir. 2020);
Wright v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 542, 544 (Ala. 1995).
87. Opperman v. Path, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Anderson v. County of
Becker, No. 08-5687 ADM/RLE, 2009 WL 3164769, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2009).
88. Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
89. Gates v. Black Hills Health Care Sys., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1031–32 (D.S.D. 2014).
90. Magenis v. Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1110–11 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
91. Salcedo v. Hann, 936 F.3d 1162, 1171 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 652B, cmt. d).
92. Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984).
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shame,”93 “highly embarrassing,”94 or “injur[ing] . . . human dignity and peace
of mind.”95 This litany of descriptors, however, provides little guidance and
predictability to courts.
Finally, some courts simply decide, with little to no explanation, that the
invasion could or could not ever be offensive. As J. Thomas McCarthy noted,
without “a definition or litmus test of offensiveness,” courts must rely on their
own “intuition” on a “case by case basis.”96 With little cohesion or guidance, it
is no surprise that in many cases courts do not provide much of a basis or
explanation for their judgments of offensiveness. At times these visceral
decisions involve no head scratching, but other times they do. For example, it
certainly seems plausible that a reasonable jury could conclude that videotaping
someone with their pants down while having their groin area examined97 or
falsely suggesting they sexually abused a minor98 might be highly offensive. But
it is less clear why other courts determined that no reasonable person could ever
conclude that surreptitious surveillance of an ex-employee,99 disclosure of a
woman’s breast cancer surgery,100 or falsely implying someone no longer
associates with their race101 might be highly offensive.
With less structure imposed, the conscious and unconscious biases of
decision-makers are more likely to weigh into the analysis. As others have
observed, brute sense impressions are foundations that simply afford no
counterargument, privileging the judge’s own views on offensiveness.102
C.

Critical Traps

The way offensiveness is analyzed—through what lens, with what criteria,
and with what precision—is critically important. Consider the Supreme Court’s
93. Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 122 (W.D. Pa. 2019); Buller v.
Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
94. Pawlaczyk v. Besser Credit Union, No. 14-CV-10983, 2014 WL 5425576, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 22, 2014); see also Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (equating
highly offensive matters with those whose “disclosure would cause emotional distress or embarrassment
to a reasonable person”).
95. Michaels v. Internet Ent. Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 842 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
96. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 5:95; Moreham, supra note 32, at 174–77 (noting highlyoffensiveness test lacks clear application principles, making it unpredictable).
97. Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
98. Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 265 (Pa. 1993).
99. Scherer Design Grp., LLC v. Schwartz, No. 18-3540, 2018 WL 3613421, at *3 (D.N.J. July
26, 2018); see also Scherer Design Grp., LLC v. Ahead Eng’g LLC, 764 F. App’x 147, 154–55 (3d Cir.
2019) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
100. Mark v. City of Hattiesburg, 2016-CA-01638-COA (¶ 31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (en banc)
(affirming trial court’s directed verdict because nothing suggests that a breast cancer diagnosis or
surgery could be highly offensive to the reasonable person), aff’d on other grounds, 2016-CT-01638-SCT,
289 So. 3d 294 (Miss. 2020).
101. Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982).
102. Kahan et al., supra note 30, at 841–42.
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recent brush with offensiveness in another legal context in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.103 Phillips, a baker, had refused to make a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple, contending that doing so offended his
legitimately-held religious beliefs.104 The Colorado Civil Rights Commission
ordered Phillips to sell wedding cakes to all customers equally, and Phillips
appealed, arguing that the Commission’s hostility towards his religion violated
the Free Exercise Clause.105 The Supreme Court agreed with Phillips.106 The
majority’s reasoning relied heavily on the fact that the Commission had allowed
other bakers to stand in their refusal to create other types of offensive cakes—
those with anti-same-sex-marriage messages.107 The Court held that the
Commission regulated based on its own determination of which cake was
offensive and which was not.108
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the bakers’ refusals were not
comparable—because the source of their offensiveness was different.109
Ginsburg made a critical distinction about the case and in the process about
offensiveness:
Phillips declined to make a cake he found offensive where the
offensiveness was determined solely by the identity of the customer
requesting it. The three other bakeries declined to make cakes where
their objection was due to the demeaning message the requested product
would literally display.110
By parsing the source of the offense (rather than simply the fact of the
offense or its intensity), Ginsburg unraveled the underlying issues, more clearly
justifying her conclusion.
Inspired by Ginsburg’s surgical approach to offensiveness, we undertook
a project to assess the state of the “highly offensive” prong in the three relevant
privacy torts. We carefully analyzed the exposition of offensiveness, inquiring
whether and to what extent the court engaged with the concept of offensiveness
and assessing how the court’s reasoning justified its conclusions.
While the privacy interests each tort seeks to address vary, we reviewed
intrusion-upon-seclusion, public-disclosure-of-private-facts, and false-light
privacy tort cases, focusing on the most recent cases and cases that contained

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Id. at 1723–24, 1726.
Id. at 1730–31.
Id. at 1727–32.
Id. at 1731–32.
Id. at 1731.
Id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1750–51.
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lengthier discussions of the offensiveness of the trigger.111 We classified cases
by tort, whether they disposed of the offensiveness element as a matter of law
at the dismissal stage, decided it at summary judgment, or ultimately left it for
the trier of fact, and by the reason for the court’s offensiveness analysis, as well
as any standard the court may have applied in reaching its conclusion.
While not all courts get it wrong, we identified six analytical traps that
plague the offensiveness analysis in privacy law. These are not the only
analytical missteps courts make in conducting the torts’ offensiveness analysis,
but they were some of the most frequently observed. While we label these
“critical traps,” we recognize that some, after years of precedent, form the
common law of the state. For example, in Illinois, an intrusion must result in
mental anguish and suffering to the plaintiff to be actionable.112 This element
appears to find its origins from a 1977 appellate case that, upon finding there
was not a harmful intrusion, also found that the plaintiff’s alleged injury and
hospitalization after the alleged intrusion were not foreseeable and could not be
recovered as damages.113 While the court did not hold that an intrusion had to
cause anguish or suffering to be actionable, it is clear that today, in the state of
Illinois, it does.114 The analytical traps discussed below make the standard
unpredictable and unsurmountable, and sometimes meaningless.
1. Misidentifying What Needs To Be Offensive
Surprisingly, courts have trouble pinpointing the conduct or material
(trigger) that must be judged offensive in each tort. For the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, the elements dictate that it is the act of the invasion itself that
must be highly offensive.115 But intrusion claims are often summarily dismissed

111. Our search on legal databases yielded all privacy tort cases from 2011–2021 that included
mention of the “highly offensive” element. To narrow our analysis to the more substantive discussions
of the element, we limited our sample to cases in which the words “offensive” or “offensiveness”
appeared at least six times in the text.
112. E.g., Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Similarly, it appears
Illinois and Pennsylvania courts require that an intrusion disclose or reveal highly embarrassing,
offensive facts in order to meet the offensiveness prong. See, e.g., Eash v. City of York, 450 F. Supp.
3d 568, 580 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Trib. Rev. Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 248 (Pa. 2002)); Cooney v. Chi. Pub.
Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
113. Bank of Ind. v. Tremunde, 365 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
114. See, e.g., Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 943, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Busse v.
Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 101, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d
1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting a necessary element of intrusion is that the intrusion must
“cause[] anguish and suffering”).
115. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652B; Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 207 (2012) (“The intrusion tort penalizes conduct—offensive
observations—not revelations.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
2007, 2013 (2010) (noting that courts are meant “to focus on the offensiveness of the information
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if the content revealed by the intrusion was not offensive or shameful enough.116
According to these cases, which deviate from the Restatement and spirit of the
tort, an intrusion is not offensive unless it invades matters that “are facially
embarrassing and highly offensive if disclosed.”117
Examples abound. One court found that an employer’s intrusion into a
former employee’s cellphone was not actionable because the employer did not
discover anything that was “facially embarrassing and highly offensive if
disclosed.”118 Another found that the strength of plaintiffs’ intrusion claims
against Facebook depended on the nature of the data that was collected from
plaintiffs and whether it was, in and of itself, sensitive.119
Such reasoning is troubling because, regardless of the offensiveness of the
intrusion, the plaintiff is denied redress if the intrusion does not unveil a highly
offensive fact or matter. For example, a plaintiff would have no cause of action
against a Peeping Tom who mechanically peered into her bathroom but only
observed her brushing her teeth.
2. Mis-framing the Offense
A woman poses nude in a bathtub for an art book.120 Years later, a popular
magazine of large circulation publishes the picture as a feature titled
“Centerfold” without her knowledge and consent.121 The woman sues, claiming
that the image placed her in an unchaste, false light.122 The court, a white male
senior district court judge, concludes that the alleged violation could not have
been offensive.123 Specifically, the court stated that it had “difficulty in
discerning ‘the [offensive] false light’ in which plaintiff was placed, if any” by
being “photographed in a bathtub”; the picture, according to the court, only
possibly suggested that “plaintiff bathes when in fact she [might] not.”124 The
plaintiff, however, clearly took offense not to the suggestion that she bathed,
but rather that she would willingly pose nude for a widely circulated magazine.
By construing the plaintiff’s offense too narrowly, the court applied its
offensiveness analysis to the wrong trigger.

gathering in the intrusion context,” but not the public disclosure context and “this fine distinction often
eludes them”).
116. See, e.g., Boring, 362 F. App’x at 278–80; Cooney, 943 N.E.2d at 32.
117. Vega, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (quoting Cooney, 943 N.E.2d at 32).
118. Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail IL, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 143813-U, ¶ 29 (quoting Cooney, 943
N.E.2d at 32).
119. Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1193–94 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
120. McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
121. Id. at 527–28.
122. Id. at 528.
123. Id. at 529.
124. Id.
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When determining offensiveness, courts sometimes miss the forest for the
trees by failing to properly frame the violation in context. This can occur when
the trigger is framed too narrowly (as in the case above) or when the trigger is
framed too broadly.
Overextending the frame can overlook the offensiveness of the publicity
given to a private matter. For example, in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,125 a
book about the 1960s Great Society identified the plaintiff, a private individual,
as a drunk who could not keep a job, an adulterer, and a neglectful husband and
father.126 The court determined that the portrayal was not highly offensive
because the focus of the book was not on the plaintiff, as he was just one example
of the many African Americans who had migrated to the North during the
period.127 The court expanded the frame too widely, denying the plaintiff
redress simply because the offensive disclosure was buried within a larger
narrative.
3. Inserting a Harm Requirement
None of the three privacy torts discussed require actual harm or injury to
prove an invasion of privacy.128 Unlike palpable harm, offensiveness seems
immeasurable. With nothing to point to or grasp, courts sometimes seek to
inject an element of injury or harm into the torts’ analysis or deny the violations’
offensiveness because the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege specific injury or
damages.129
In McGreal v. AT&T Corporation,130 for example, the district court
dismissed a cellphone account holder’s intrusion claim when her cellphone call
and text log records were inappropriately obtained, because she could prove no
ensuing injury.131 According to the court, intrusion claims required her to show
that the invasion caused “anguish and suffering.”132 Another court overturned a
125. No. 91 C 8143, 1993 WL 68071 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d, 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirmed
on newsworthiness grounds).
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id. at *6.
128. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 652B, 652D, 652E; In re Facebook Internet
Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 843 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff need not show actual loss
to establish standing for common-law claims of invasion of privacy.”); Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel
J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. 793, 810 (2022) (noting that courts “presume the existence
of harm” in privacy tort law).
129. See, e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Dwyer v. Am.
Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting a necessary element of intrusion is
that the intrusion must “cause[] anguish and suffering”).
130. 892 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
131. Id. at 1015–16.
132. Id. at 1015 (quoting Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007)); see also Manigault-Johnson v. Google, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-1032, 2019 WL 3006646, at *6 (D.S.C.
Mar. 31, 2019) (citing to no case law but finding that “unadorned they-harmed-me allegation[s] [are]
wholly insufficient”).
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five million dollar jury verdict for a couple’s intrusion claims because the
plaintiffs “sought no medical or psychological assistance for any anguish or
suffering.”133 The court seemed particularly skeptical of the wife’s claims of
harm, because “she was not precluded from any work or social activity because
of her alleged emotional suffering.”134
Indeed, “[t]o say that a ‘mere’ privacy invasion is not capable of inflicting
an ‘actual injury’ serious enough is to disregard the importance of privacy in our
society.”135 Courts’ superimposed harm requirement considerably shrinks the
torts’ ability to redress offensive invasions, particularly where harm is narrowly
construed.136
4. Overemphasis on Social Utility of the Trigger
Courts have also tended to place undue weight on the perceived social
utility of the trigger tipping the scales against a finding of offensiveness. Social
utility can encompass the defendant’s motives or the public’s potential interest
in the information disclosed.137 At times, any hint of a justification results in
quick absolution of the trigger’s offensiveness.138
When courts find defendants are motivated by legitimate purposes, they
tend to find privacy intrusions not offensive.139 The Supreme Court of Kansas,
for example, found a doctor’s unwarranted disclosure of his patient’s suicidal
thoughts and history of psychiatric treatment not highly offensive because she

133. Schmidt v. Ameritech Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 309, 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
134. Id. at 316.
135. In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 786 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see
also Nayab v. Cap. One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 491 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Privacy torts do not
always require additional consequences to be actionable.” (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876
F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017))); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361,
361 (2014) (criticizing privacy harm exceptionalism); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing To Hide” and
Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 768–69 (2007) [hereinafter Solove, “I’ve
Got Nothing to Hide”] (observing that limiting privacy harms to “dead bodies” overlooks non-visceral
privacy harms that must be addressed even if less sensational than a horror movie).
136. See Pruitt, supra note 30, at 972 (discussing how tort law is gendered and compels women “to
articulate their injuries in a way that reflect[s] masculine values and interest” in order to obtain a
recovery).
137. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mayweather, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 240–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017);
Godbehere v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 789 (Ariz. 1989).
138. See Makdisi, supra note 52, at 1011 (noting that where a defendant’s interest has some
legitimate purpose, conduct not exceeding that purpose “is likely to be construed not highly offensive
as a matter of law”); Cavico, supra note 22, at 1286, 1320 (noting that where an employer can point to
a legitimate, business reason for an intrusion, courts are likely not to find liability).
139. Lord Carswell from the House of Lords observed the same. Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004]
UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC (HL) 457, [¶ 166] (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (Carswell, L., dissenting)
(“It also follows in my opinion that the motives of the respondents in publishing the information,
which they claim to have done in order to give a sympathetic treatment to the subject, do not constitute
a defence, if the publication of the material . . . revealed confidential material.”).
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was involved in a custody dispute.140 In another case, the private individual who
thwarted President Ford’s assassination attempt was outed as gay and sued for
the unwarranted publicity.141 The disclosure was pardoned as inoffensive
because, among other things, according to the court, the media outlet’s
motivation was to dispel “the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak
and unheroic figures.”142
Newsworthiness, however unworthy, is also a “get out of jail free” card for
the offensiveness analysis. Even if the disclosure of a private fact is offensive,
it cannot be actionable if the fact is of legitimate public concern (i.e.,
newsworthy).143 While individuals’ privacy must be balanced against the First
Amendment right to disseminate news and information,144 the balance always
tips in favor of disclosure if the standard is simply circularly descriptive—it was
published because it was newsworthy.145 Some courts have found that
“newsworthiness is not limited to ‘news,’” but rather also extends to facts given
to the public for purposes of “amusement or enlightenment.”146 Indeed, courts
have observed that “at a time when entertainment news and celebrity gossip
often seem to matter more than serious policy discussions, . . . the publication
of . . . otherwise intimate facts [are] necessarily . . . considered newsworthy.”147
But this expansive interpretation of legitimate public concern seems to read the
word “legitimate” out of the standard.148
Moreover, just because a particular event may be newsworthy, does not
mean all possible accompanying facts or images are necessarily so. Consider the
Pittsburgh Steelers football fan who appeared with his pants zipper open in a
widely circulated image.149 The court reasoned that because the football game
where the picture was taken was newsworthy, the embarrassing image of his
groin was also newsworthy.150 Similarly, the filming of a plaintiff in serious
physical distress at a hospital after ingesting a drug called Blue Nitro was
deemed newsworthy because the story on Blue Nitro and its increased use was

140. Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Kan. 1985).
141. Sipple v. Chron. Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666–67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
142. Id. at 670.
143. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 480–81.
146. Jackson v. Mayweather, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). But see Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that “a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake” is not sufficient for newsworthiness).
147. Jackson, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 250.
148. See Post, supra note 22, at 1004 (“That the public is in fact curious may well be true, but it
merely restates the problem.”).
149. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
150. Id. at 861–62.
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newsworthy.151 Because nearly any fact, regardless of its independent
newsworthiness, can be associated with some broader newsworthy story or
societal comment, the newsworthy exception can swallow the offensiveness
analysis.152
5. Fumbling with Evolving Norms
Novel social issues and emerging technologies challenge courts’
application of norms that have not fully evolved. Apple contends that collecting
and disclosing users’ unique device identifier number, geolocation, and other
personal data is not a breach of social norms because it is a routine commercial
activity.153 Google shares people’s viewing history on YouTube, along with
other personally identifiable information, to place targeted ads contrary to its
own policies.154 One court suggests Facebook should argue that automated
machine intrusions are less offensive than the human gaze.155 Are these practices
highly offensive to a reasonable person?
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offensive” as “causing displeasure, anger,
or resentment; esp., repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or moral.”156
The determination of offensiveness cannot be unglued from a look to what
society accepts as correct. But what is “decent or moral” and by whose
“prevailing” sense? Norms are not always established, articulable observations
waiting to be definitively discovered by judges or juries.157
Instead, norms (and, by extension, offensiveness) are time, place,
generation, and culture specific.158 An application of community norms
necessarily requires familiarity with the community at issue.159 For this, judges
151. Carter v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Cnty., No. D038091, 2002 WL 27229, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 10, 2002).
152. David A. Anderson, The Failure of American Privacy Law, in PROTECTING PRIVACY: THE
CLIFFORD CHANCE LECTURES 139, 139–41 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1999) (“Privacy law in the
United States delivers far less than it promises because it resolves virtually all . . . conflicts in favour
of information, candour, and free speech.”).
153. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
154. In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 973–74, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
155. In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 796 (N.D. Cal.
2019); see Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
156. Offensive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
157. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV.
1, 47 (1996).
158. Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 349 (“Differences of opinion over which subjects are offensive
can be found at any moment in history among different geographical regions, or levels of social,
economic, or educational status.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1026 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, The Virtues of Knowing
Less] (noting that “in all but the most extreme cases, it will be difficult to find a social consensus” on
privacy).
159. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652D, cmt. c (explaining the offensiveness of any
privacy invasion is to be judged based on “the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the
plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens”); see also Austl Broad Corp v Lenah Game
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must engage in more of a sociological inquiry than a legal one, having “to enter
imaginatively into a world that [may] not [be] the[ir] natural habitat.”160 As
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky points out, the inquiry into the plaintiff’s community
and its norms presents both theoretical and doctrinal difficulties in a
heterogeneous society.161 We are no longer one community, rather a collection
of subcommunities espousing values that can diverge from the majority.162
In borderline cases, thoughtful courts acknowledge when a call is
premature and defer to the wisdom of juries, who are better positioned to
understand “the subjective perceptions of a community.”163 Some courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, have observed that the internet and new
technology’s customs and habits are very much in flux, and expectations change
while technology is still developing.164
But in many instances, courts decide offensiveness as a matter of law.165
With new issues, some courts are quick to seek analogies to inapplicable
normative contexts. For example, in 2019, a court relied on decisions from the
1980s and 1990s involving medical records and phone numbers, to conclude that
a defendant’s tracking of plaintiff’s keystrokes and mouse clicks was not a highly
offensive intrusion.166 Another recent case concluded that disclosure of
plaintiffs’ income and credit information to third-party marketers could not be
highly offensive because it is not akin to disclosing a planned mastectomy.167
Equally troubling results ensue when courts are too quick to call norms in
flux—without analysis, which often results in faulty reasoning and bad
precedent. A string of technology-related cases holds that business practices, if
routine, cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The underlying
logic, one must guess, is since the practice has become commonplace, it is
acceptable to society, and therefore fits within the prevailing sense of what is
decent or moral. This slippery logic, however, assumes that consumers are
Meats Pty Ltd (2001) HCA 63, ¶ 252 (Austl.) (“Judges sometimes make assumptions about current
conditions and modern society as bases for their decisions. . . . An assumption of such a kind may be
unsafe because the judge making it is necessarily making an earlier assumption that he or she is
sufficiently informed, or exposed to the subject matter in question to enable an assumption to be made
about it.”).
160. Douglass v. Hustler Mag., Inc. 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining offensiveness
of false light in “the world of nude modeling and (as they are called in the trade) ‘provocative’
magazines”).
161. See generally Lidsky, supra note 157 (analyzing the difficulty courts face in defining
“offensiveness” based on community values and norms).
162. Id. at 1.
163. Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 898, 903–04 (Colo. 2002).
164. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2233 (2018); Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F.
Supp. 3d 1064, 1079 (N.D. Cal 2016).
165. McClurg, supra note 22, at 999–1005.
166. Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 122–23 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (relying on
cases that applied the wrong intrusion standard or had been abrogated).
167. Bovay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 142672-U, ¶ 46.
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knowledgeable about such practices, explicitly accept them, and have a forum
to object to them.
In In re iPhone Application Litigation,168 the court concluded that plaintiffs’
allegations of Apple and others violating their privacy by collecting and
disclosing their unique device identifier number, geolocation, and other
personal data did not amount to an invasion of privacy because it was a routine
commercial activity.169 However, the court did not cite to any facts that would
suggest the defendants’ activity of compiling and disclosing such data was
routine, nor did it explain why the activity was not a breach of social norms.170
The court also failed to explain why it treated the two as mutually exclusive.171
Instead, the court relied wholly on Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc.,172 an earlier
brick-and-mortar case finding that a retailer’s practice of requesting zip codes
at checkout to mail customers promotions, while telling them the zip codes were
used for an internal survey, was not offensive.173
The precedent snowballed. Many other technology-related intrusions
have failed the offensiveness test on the same basis. When plaintiffs sued
Google over its practice of logging and sharing personal identifiable
information (including browsing habits, search queries, demographic
information, viewing history on YouTube, etc.) to target ads, contrary to its
own policies,174 the court found the practice inoffensive.175 Similarly, courts have
concluded that placing cookies to track users’ browsing histories is inoffensive
because it is “part of routine internet functionality[,] can be easily blocked,”176
and can serve a legitimate commercial purpose.177 Indeed, in In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litigation,178 the Third Circuit, citing to only one case, noted
that “courts have long understood that tracking cookies can serve legitimate
[business] purposes” and are “so widely accepted a part of Internet commerce
that it cannot possibly be considered ‘highly offensive.’”179
168. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
169. Id. at 1063.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
173. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (citing Folgelstrom, 125 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 265).
174. In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 973–74, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
175. Id. at 987–88.
176. In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
177. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 294 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing In re
DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)) (noting that defendant’s
placement of cookies on plaintiff’s computers was not “to perpetuate torts on millions of Internet users,
but to make money by providing a valued service to commercial Web sites”).
178. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).
179. Id. at 294; see also Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 122–23 (W.D. Pa.
2019) (noting that the surreptitious gathering of information on the internet may cause concern but “is
not enough to give rise to tort liability” that “requires conduct that may outrage or cause mental
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It is unclear why the fact that a privacy invasion may serve a practical
business purpose is dispositive of its offensiveness. All intentional privacy
invasions serve some purpose to the defendant, be it commercial or personal,
but that should not legitimize them offhand.180 It is also unclear why the
proverbial “but everyone else [in my industry] is doing it” makes the conduct
at issue socially acceptable and inoffensive. The practical business purpose
rationale creates an incentive to employ an invasive practice on a regular basis.181
6. Injecting Bias
Courts employ their perception of the reasonable person when
determining offensiveness. However, it becomes problematic when courts
project their own biases on to the reasonable person.
Could a reasonable person ever find it offensive for a firm to tell the press
that its former employee missed work for “female problems”? One court found
it inoffensive.182 Would a reasonable person consider public revelations that a
private person ate insects, hurt themselves to collect unemployment, and
engaged in reckless and dishonest conduct to be offensive? One court
determined that no reasonable juror would find those disclosures offensive
because they portrayed the male plaintiff as a “tough, aggressive maverick, an
archetypal character occupying a respected place in the American
consciousness.”183
The projection of bias is difficult to avoid, given humans’ tendency to
overestimate public agreement with their own attitudes and judgments.184 This
false consensus bias causes individuals to overestimate the extent to which their

suffering, shame, or humiliation”); Benjamin Zhu, Note, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying
Intrusion upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2401 (2014) (observing
that intrusions involving data collection are unlikely to meet the tort’s offensiveness prong).
180. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 144–47 (2004)
(proposing that where novel practices breach or threaten entrenched norms these should be evaluated
by how they promote social and moral values with consideration given to preventing information-based
harms and informational inequality).
181. Jamuna D. Kelley, Note, A Computer with a View, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 187, 215–17 (2008)
(noting this standard “suggests that when society becomes sufficiently accustomed to a certain
surveillance practice, its presence and eventual practice becomes ingrained in the social fabric that any
‘reasonable’ person is precluded from finding it highly offensive”).
182. Polansky v. Sw. Airlines, 75 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (finding disclosure
inoffensive because women had publicly alleged a “kaleidoscope of symptoms” resulting from working
in a “sick-building”).
183. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1288–89 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
184. See Robyn M. Dawes, Statistical Criteria for Establishing a Truly False Consensus Effect, 25 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1, 1 (1989); Christopher G. Wetzel & Marsha D. Walton, Developing
Biased Social Judgments: The False-Consensus Effect, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1352, 1352
(1985).
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perception of social norms are shared,185 which may explain why courts
frequently decide offensiveness as a matter of law in privacy cases.186 Other
scholars have similarly warned that judges, legislators, and citizens should be
wary of these tendencies to be overconfident in the unassailable correctness of
certain perceptions, particularly those impacting women and racial minorities,187
and the extent to which such perceptions are shared with others.188 Because what
does or does not offend a sixty-eight-year-old white man (who is the average
demographic of the federal judiciary)189 does not necessarily correlate with what
offends the social construct that is the reasonable person.190
In Plaxico v. Michael,191 the Mississippi Supreme Court absolved an exhusband’s intrusion into his ex-wife’s bedroom to take pictures of her naked and
engaged in sexual conduct with another woman, because the former couple was
in a custody battle.192 According to the court, because the defendant suspected
his wife was in a homosexual relationship and was concerned for the welfare of
his minor child, most reasonable people would not find his conduct highly
offensive.193 All of the justices on the court were men. One dissenting opinion
joined by two other justices believed the majority erred, but only because the
ex-husband’s conduct could have been offensive to the ex-wife’s lover, who was
not part of the custody dispute.194 Only one justice would have found the
defendant’s intrusion highly offensive to both women involved.195
185. Janneke K. Oostrom, Nils C. Köbis, Richard Ronay & Myckel Cremers, False Consensus in
Situational Judgment Tests: What Would Others Do?, 71 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 33, 36 (2017); Lee Ross,
David Greene & Pamela House, The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and
Attribution Process, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 279, 285–86 (1977); see also Bruce E. Boyden,
Regulating at the End of Privacy, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 173, 174–82 (2013) (arguing judges’ perceptions
of norms are tied to those prevailing at the time when their identity and self-perceptions in relation to
society were formed, which makes it more difficult to objectively assess current privacy norms).
186. McClurg, supra note 22, at 999–1005 (noting courts’ propensity to decide offensiveness as a
matter of law).
187. Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias, supra note 30, at 467, 470.
188. Kahan et al., supra note 30, at 843–54.
189. See
FED. JUD. CTR.,
Demography
of
Article
III
Judges,
1789–2020,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges [https://perma.cc/
MUN4-7TU5] (noting that average age of a federal judge in 2020 was 68 years old); CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, EXAMINING THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITIONS OF U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
COURTS 3 (2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/examining-demographic-compositionsu-s-circuit-district-courts/ [https://perma.cc/7S3M-UBZS] (click on “Download” dropdown; then click
on “Report” hyperlink) (noting that in 2019 over 70% of judges on the federal bench were white and
women make up only 27% of district court judges).
190. See Lidsky, supra note 157, at 41 (noting American society is deeply divided by sex, age, class,
religion, etc. “all with somewhat differing norms and expectations of conduct”); Post, supra note 22, at
961.
191. 96-CA-00791-SCT, 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999) (en banc).
192. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 735 So. 2d at 1040.
193. Id. ¶ 16, 735 So. 2d at 1040.
194. Id. ¶ 24, 735 So. 2d at 1041 (McRae, J., dissenting).
195. Id. ¶¶ 20–23, 735 So. 2d at 1040–41 (Banks, J., dissenting).
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Sometimes a plaintiff’s prior conduct may trigger biases. Psychologists
note that when decision-makers are evaluating conduct or facts, they are prone
to fall into what is termed the culpable control model of blame, wherein
individuals are more likely to blame someone if they acted in a manner that
contradicts the factfinder’s perception of social norms.196 Similarly, when a
plaintiff’s behavior confirms a perceived stereotype of her gender or group, the
plaintiff’s behavior may be attributed to factors within her control, as opposed
to situational factors, such as the defendant’s conduct, outside her control.197 In
Jackson v. Mayweather,198 for example, the court found that former boxing
champion Floyd Mayweather Jr.’s vengeful posts on Facebook and Instagram,
after a violent and contentious break-up, that plaintiff had an abortion, “killed
[their] twin babies,”199 and had “extensive cosmetic surgery procedures” were
not actionable because plaintiff had in the past “willingly participated in
publication of information about her own life and her relationship with
Mayweather.”200 Other times, courts are simply unable to identify with the
plaintiff and why the conduct at issue could offend. For example, another court
found that an article that falsely suggested that the plaintiffs, teenage girls, were
masculine in nature could not possibly “be objectionable to the ordinary
reasonable man under the circumstances.”201
Not all courts project their own biases onto the reasonable person. For
example, one plaintiff brought a false-light claim that alleged that nude pictures
of herself published in Hustler magazine without her consent, where she was
with another woman in a suggestive position with accompanying text that said
“climactic moments,” falsely suggested she was a lesbian.202 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed.203 It did not think that “Hustler was seriously insinuating—or that its
readership would think—that [the plaintiff] [was] a lesbian” because “Hustler is
a magazine for men” and “[f]ew men are interested in lesbians.”204 The court,
however, recognized that a reasonable person or jury viewing the pictures might
disagree.205

196. See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL.
556 (2009) (analyzing the conditions that encourage and mitigate blame when harmful events occur);
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 368 (1992) (analyzing “the
perceived blameworthiness of an action on judgment of its causal impact on a harmful outcome”).
197. See Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias, supra note 30, at 484–85.
198. 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
199. Id. at 241–42.
200. Id. at 242–51.
201. Fudge v. Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1019 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
202. Douglass v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985).
203. Id. at 1135.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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Given the morass that is offensiveness and courts’ propensity to fall into
the various critical traps outlined above, should privacy law simply abandon or
replace its offensiveness prong?
D.

Abandoning Offensiveness?

As it stands today, the legal operation of offensiveness is ineffective. Its
current applications are not only muddled, but too narrow for a rapidly
changing world. Some scholars have advocated for changes to the standard and
its application, such as lowering the “highly offensive” requirement to simply
“offensive” to mirror today’s sensibilities, at least in some circumstances.206
Andrew McClurg has proposed expanding Miller’s factors to permit the
intrusion tort to apply to conduct occurring in public spaces.207 Others have
criticized the torts’ highly offensive standard and its tendency to set the bar too
high for plaintiffs to recover from legitimate privacy harms.208
Disparate areas of law have flirted with abandoning offensiveness,
recognizing the common problems of vagueness, subjectivity, overbreadth, and
potential bias inherent in the offensiveness analysis. The Supreme Court
excised the offensiveness analysis from trademark law when it declared the
Lanham Act’s prohibition on disparaging and scandalous marks as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.209 Critics have attacked § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, arguing that it grants online service providers
too broad of an immunity because offensive material is too subjectively and
expansively defined.210 The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause has been
used to remove religious symbols, speech, and conduct from government
property or events that may offend non-adherents of the religion.211 In fact,
most Establishment Clause suits are brought by plaintiffs who are offended by

206. Josh Blackman, Note, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital
Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image Over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 313, 363–64 (2009) (noting that California’s paparazzi law has adopted the less burdensome
offensive requirement, as opposed to the highly-offensive-to-a-reasonable-person standard); Citron,
supra note 22, at 1850–52.
207. McClurg, supra note 22, at 1058–59.
208. See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 22, at 1319–23; Citron, supra note 22, at 1850–52; Makdisi, supra
note 52, at 1005–06, 1010–12; Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1919 (2010); Scharf, supra note 52, at 1104–05; Lindsey A. Strachan,
Re-mapping Privacy Law: How the Google Maps Scandal Requires Tort Law Reform, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
1, 14 (2011).
209. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65
(2017).
210. See Michael D. Smith & Marshall Van Alstyne, It’s Time To Update Section 230, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/08/its-time-to-update-section-230 [https://perma.cc/
A5KX-XANL (dark archive)]; DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230 NURTURING, supra note 50, at 4.
211. William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 352 (1991).
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a religious display or religious practice.212 Justices Gorsuch and Thomas have
argued for eliminating the offense as a ticket to standing in an Establishment
Clause claim.213 This would, according to the Justices, “bring with it the
welcome side effect of rescuing the federal judiciary from the sordid business
of having to pass aesthetic judgment, one by one, on every public display in this
country for its perceived capacity to give offense.”214
In privacy law, courts and scholars from around the world have also
suggested abandoning the concept of offensiveness completely.215 The High
Court of Australia’s Chief Judge Gleeson rejected its application in Australia
and instead found that the U.S. privacy law’s highly offensive prong is simply
“a useful practical test” to determine what information or matter is private.216
One member of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords observed the “highly
offensive” standard was “a recipe for confusion” that can easily bring into
account issues that should go more to proportionality and damages.217 In that
case, celebrity fashion model Naomi Campbell filed suit against the owners of
a tabloid that published a story about her narcotics addiction.218 The court was
split as to whether the fact that Campbell attended Narcotics Anonymous, the
frequency of such attendance, and pictures of her leaving the Narcotics
Anonymous meeting in London were private and offensive facts.219 Two
members of the high court concluded it was unnecessary to inquire whether the
information published was highly offensive when it is clearly private.220 The
standard, according to one of them, is only helpful “in cases where there is room
for doubt” as to whether a matter is truly private.221
Discussing a comparable offensiveness standard in the context of New
Zealand law, Professor N.A. Moreham has argued that the torts’ highly
212. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (noting plaintiffs
claimed they were “offended by the sight of the memorial [which included a display of a Latin cross]
on public land”); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 572 (2014) (explaining that plaintiff found
the town board meeting prayers offensive); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 707 (2010) (noting
plaintiff’s claim that he was “offended by the presence of a religious symbol on federal land”); Sch.
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 209 (1963) (presenting expert testimony that school’s
day begin with prayer that often included readings from the New Testament were offensive to Jewish
students).
213. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Thomas, J., joining in the
concurrence).
214. Id. at 2103.
215. Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC (HL) 457, [¶¶ 21–31] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (UK); Hosking v. Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [246], [249] (N.Z.);
Moreham, supra note 32, at 162; Stuart Hargreaves, ‘Relational Privacy’ & Tort, 23 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 433, 435 (2017).
216. Austl Broad Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 308 CLR 199 ¶ 42 (Austl.).
217. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [¶ 22].
218. See id. [¶¶ 1–9].
219. See id. [¶¶ 23, 36].
220. Id. [¶¶ 96, 166].
221. Id. [¶ 94].
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offensive element should be eliminated for three reasons. First, there is a lack
of clear principles or guidance as to how courts should determine offensiveness
because courts oftentimes determine offensiveness with no reasoning or
explanation.222 Even in cases where courts have articulated useful factors to
consider, they then fail to apply them.223 These poorly reasoned decisions make
the outcome of the analysis, to the extent any exists, unpredictable.224 Second,
Moreham argues that courts have adopted too narrow of a view of what
constitutes highly offensive and have thus left various privacy harms
unremedied.225 Finally, Moreham claims the highly offensive element is
unnecessary because it is duplicative of the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, as any conduct or matter that is private would be highly offensive if
invaded.226
Moreham’s arguments are compelling, but do not support the complete
abandonment of the troubled analysis. Although offensiveness lacks clear
principles or guidance, scholarly and judicial attention can find a remedy.
Acknowledgment of offensiveness’s pitfalls and a better elucidated rubric for its
analysis can lead the way. The fact that courts have construed offensiveness
narrowly, although damaging, is a symptom of its historical conundrum and a
criticism of courts’ super-imposition of a harm requirement. And it is too swift
to conclude that a reasonable expectation of privacy subsumes the offensiveness
analysis. For example, a person keeping a caged pet ferret in the privacy of their
home might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their ferret ownership
status if they let no one into their house and the ferret never leaves the house,
but disclosure of the same would not be highly offensive.
Abandoning the challenge is not the answer. A reasoned analysis of what
offends us and why—and whether it should be allowed—is a fundamental duty
of the legal system. It serves to legitimize practices, behaviors, and norms—and
deters others from becoming commonplace or accepted. We must begin to
articulate clear, reasoned, and fair ways to understand offense because courts
are not the only ones making those crucial, norm-setting, and potentially
chilling determinations. Increasingly, businesses and other nonlegal third
parties are facing qualitative decisions in the context of taking down online
information or delisting search requests. The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation created a right to be forgotten, putting the burden on
online entities to determine the nature of allegedly harmful information

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Moreham, supra note 32, at 174–75.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 179–86.
Id. at 186–89.
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online.227 Policy and legal teams at technology giants like Facebook are making
similar decisions on newsworthiness, offensiveness, and relevance.228 More than
ever, we need to understand offensiveness.
But how can we conceive offensiveness given the human biases, confusion
surrounding harm, knotty critical thinking, and entanglements with social
mores? The next section pivots to examine approaches to the legal regulation of
offensiveness from a philosophical lens. Although offensiveness in the realm of
privacy torts has not been extensively studied, it is instructive to analyze the
ways in which noted philosophers have framed offensiveness in other contexts.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING OFFENSIVENESS
Conceptualizing offensiveness involves a study of the concept through
both philosophical and psychological lenses and an analysis of the concept’s
prominent perspectives.229 These perspectives will later inform a reasoned
rubric to guide the offensiveness analysis in privacy torts.
“Offense” refers to unreflective or emotional reactions that are
“universally disliked,” such as “[p]assing annoyance, disappointment, disgust,
embarrassment, and various other disliked conditions such as fear, anxiety, and
minor (‘harmless’) aches and pains” stemming from affronts to sensibilities.230
Emotional triggers vary: researchers agree that some are “universal” and others
“individual-specific.”231 Paul Eckman describes humans as having an “emotion
alert database, which is written in part by our biology, through natural selection,
and in part by our individual experience.”232 For example, most humans, no
matter the culture, respond to threats or triggers conditioned by natural
selection (like snakes and vomit) with fear and disgust. Emotions can also be
elicited by idiosyncratic, learned past experiences (like the disdain for nudity in
a prudish culture or the resentment bred by racist or misogynistic
microaggressions in one who has been subject to discrimination).

227. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation), at 51–53, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=EN
[https://perma
.cc/Z5X8-Q8ZE]; see also Patricia Sánchez Abril and Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right To Be Forgotten:
Who Decides What the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363, 365 (2015).
228. Ben Smith, Is an Activist’s Pricey House News? Facebook Alone Decides, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/25/business/facebook-nypost.html [perma.cc/C4FG-KF
EB].
229. See generally Andrew von Hirsch, The Offense Principle in Criminal Law: Affront to Sensibility or
Wrongdoing?, 11 KING’S COLL. L.J. 78 (2000) [hereinafter von Hirsch, The Offense Principle] (analyzing
the basis for prohibiting offensive conduct).
230. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 1.
231. PAUL ECKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED 21–22 (2d ed. 2003).
232. Id. at 29.
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However, offense is not merely a reaction to something offensive. Offense
is a tripartite mechanism in which the person (1) suffers a disliked state, (2)
makes a concurrent snap judgment that this bad feeling was wrongfully and
unjustifiably caused by another’s wrongdoing, and (3) is led to resentment
towards its source, which serves to reinforce and magnify the unpleasantness.233
As a result of this tripartite judgment, strong emotions are unleashed.
Offense-induced emotions take over so quickly that we are unaware of the
evaluative processes that triggered them.234 Offense elicits the offended party’s
bias in a way that impairs their proper judgment on attribution and intensity.
When gripped by offense, we enter a “refractory state,” during which we
interpret all input in a way that justifies how we are feeling.235 We also ignore
or discount knowledge or new information that could disconfirm it.236
In fact, humans are psychologically prone to overclassify or over-designate
speech and conduct as offensive for a number of reasons.237 The reactive feeling
of offense is influenced by an “agential bias” or a natural tendency to over-focus
on active conduct and under-focus on more passive conduct.238 This causes
people to make mistakes in judging offensiveness because they tend to
emphasize the role of thought and choice by the alleged offender and attribute
a greater level of intent to their actions.239
Moreover, our interests in avoiding offense to promote well-being are
complex and prone to being misunderstood, which could also lead us to
misjudging the role of the offense in our lives and in the lives of others.240
Perhaps because of the agential bias, some have warned that legislators tend to
overreact to offensiveness, zealously—and disproportionately—finding
blamable conduct when it involves a perception of shock or menace to
community norms.241
All of these offended states are noisome because they intrude on reluctant
victims, trap them, and invite particularly unpleasant reactions. These
unwitting victims are then forced to take on a feeling or emotion that is
unwanted, unpleasant, and thus threatening to their autonomy, freedom, and
sense of self. What these affronts all have in common is that they cause the
233. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 2; SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 53.
234. ECKMAN, supra note 231, at 21.
235. Id. at 39.
236. Id.
237. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 54–55.
238. Id. at 55.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 92.
241. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 5 (“Any legislator who votes to punish open lewdness or
disrespect to the flag with prison terms far greater than those provided for genuinely and deliberately
harmful acts of battery or burglary must be simply registering his hatred, revulsion, or personal anxiety
rather than rationally applying some legislative principle to the facts.”).
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aggrieved to feel “trapped” because they cannot escape without unreasonable
inconvenience (or maybe even harm).242
Over decades, philosophers have studied and parsed offensiveness and
explored the nuances that trouble its analyses. At its core is its status as the
ignored little sibling of harm. While harm is “a wrongful and unexcused
invasion of interest,”243 philosopher Joel Feinberg concedes that offended
parties do not necessarily lose anything upon which they have a stake, making
harm more serious.244 Offense results in nuisance rather than palpable harm.245
Momentary disgust, exasperation, or even fear do not obviously rise to the level
of an invasion of resources, nor are they readily calculable.
Given these prickly hallmarks of offensiveness as a philosophical concept,
how should we assess it legally?
In his famous essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserted the harm
principle, which states: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.”246 Since causing offense does not in itself constitute
harm, Mill suggested that it would be “tyranny” to make personal feelings of
offense the basis for punishment.247 Nevertheless, Mill went on to suggest that
an exception could be made for violations against manners and decency done
publicly.248
Since Mill, a recognized body of work by penal theorists and philosophers
has developed—addressing the nature of offensive conduct and seeking
philosophical justifications for its penalization or proscription. Legal
philosophers, including Joel Feinberg, Martha Nussbaum, Andrew von Hirsch,
Louis B. Schwartz, and Tatjana Hörnle, have set out to understand why conduct
is offensive, disgusting, or obnoxious—a necessary starting point to make sense
of whether the law addresses it justifiably.249 Other philosophers, such as
Andrew Sneddon, have refined the concept of offensiveness in our modern
world. While these theorists did not focus on tort law or privacy generally, an
analysis of this important body of work is useful in supplying principles and
constructs for a thoughtful reconsideration of offensiveness in privacy torts.
242. Id.
243. von Hirsch, Injury, supra note 15, at 702 (citing Feinberg).
244. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 2–3.
245. Id. at 5.
246. JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 33, at 80.
247. See id. at 76–80.
248. Id. at 160.
249. It bears noting that these philosophers set out to determine under what conditions and
justifications acts triggering offense should be regulated by criminal law. This is a different question
from the one we ask here, which is how we gauge offensiveness in the context of a tort. With that said,
the penal theorists’ important work over the past decades translates well to our own inquiry, focusing
our own thinking and analysis.
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What follows are several prominent perspectives on judging offensiveness.
We draw lessons along the way that will later inform a reasoned rubric to guide
the offensiveness analysis in privacy torts.
A.

Offensiveness As Prevailing Mores

Mores have been defined as “strong ideas of right and wrong which require
certain acts and forbid others.”250 Traditionally, the rationale for prohibiting and
judging offenses was purely self-defining: a straightforward appeal to prevailing
mores. Indecency was improper; obscenity was lewd; nuisances were annoying;
and certain behaviors were simply not tolerated as infringements on community
standards.
The Prevailing Mores approach bases judgment on generalized, bare moral
indignation. The Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute on nude dancing
based on the general notion that public indecency was “malum in se,” or evil in
itself,251 and the statute appropriately reflected “moral disapproval of people
appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.”252 In concurrence,
Justice Scalia advocated for the propriety of Prevailing Mores:
Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
activities not because they harm others but because they are considered,
in the traditional phrase, “contra bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. In American
society, such prohibitions have included, for example, sadomasochism,
cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sodomy.
While there may be great diversity of view on whether various of these
prohibitions should exist (though I have found few ready to abandon, in
principle, all of them), there is no doubt that, absent specific
constitutional protection for the conduct involved, the Constitution does
not prohibit them simply because they regulate “morality.”253
Judging offensiveness by prevailing mores has been described as
“troublesome.”254 Andrew von Hirsch elegantly sums up some of the criticism,
asking “[w]hy is the offensive conduct anything more than a breach of
prevailing taboos? In a free society, how can the majority be entitled to impose
its taboos on unwilling minorities?”255
A test that only looks at community standards without further analysis
may result in prolonging injustice if those standards are unjust, biased, or
immoral.256 Mores have been used to justify censorship of obscenity, unequal
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

PAUL B. HORTON & CHESTER L. HUNT, SOCIOLOGY 59 (1968).
Malum in se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (11th ed. 2019).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991).
Id. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
von Hirsch, Injury, supra note 15, at 706.
Id.
See NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 33.
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treatment of people based on race or gender, and prohibitions on homosexual
sex.257 Using norms blindly as reflective of offensiveness serves to legitimize
and prolong stigmatization.
As philosopher Joel Feinberg noted,
[p]eople take offense—perfectly genuine offense—at many socially
useful or even necessary activities, from commercial advertisement to
inane chatter. Moreover, bigoted prejudices of a very widespread kind
(e.g., against interracial couples strolling hand in hand down the main
street of a town in the deep South) can lead onlookers to be disgusted
and shocked, even “morally” repelled, by perfectly innocent activities,
and we should be loath to permit their groundless repugnance to
outweigh the innocence of the offending conduct.258
A bare appeal to prevailing mores or community norms—the “everybody-isnot-doing-it” shortcut to judging behavior—is thus unsatisfactory in a diverse,
pluralistic society aiming for tolerance and progress.
B.

Offensiveness As Balancing Metric

Imagine yourself captive as a rider on a public bus. Your fellow riders emit
disgusting smells, eat nasty foods, copulate publicly, yell racist remarks, and
show off Nazi symbols. Feinberg’s famous thought experiment of a disastrous
bus ride with this cast of characters puts the reader in the position of assessing
which act is most vile and most likely to be ruled offensive.
Influenced by John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, Feinberg’s offense
principle holds that “criminal law may be used to protect persons from wrongful
offense, that is, from their own unpleasant mental states when wrongfully
imposed on them by other parties in a manner that violates their rights.”259
What is wrongful offense? For Feinberg, an affront is offensive if the majority
of people find it to be so.260 However, Feinberg’s analysis focuses on how the
general public would react, as opposed to the substance of their reaction.261
Meaning, he makes no reference to whether people’s reactions are reasonable,
justifiable, or even morally sound.262

257. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding prohibition of private homosexual
sodomy enacted solely on “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in [the jurisdiction] that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”).
258. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 25–26.
259. Id. at 68.
260. See id. at 35 (defining the magnitude of the offense as a function of the “extent,” meaning
“[t]he more widespread the susceptibility to a given kind of offense, the more serious is a given instance
of that kind of offense”).
261. See id. at 36–37 (“[T]he seriousness of an offense is determined by . . . [t]he magnitude of the
offense, which is a function of its intensity, duration, and extent.”).
262. See id.
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But Feinberg does not stop there; rather he acknowledges the nuance and
complexity of the concept by creating a structured balancing test inspired by
Prosser’s tort analysis concerning liability for activities which benefit one party
and bother another.263 Feinberg’s test (laid out in Appendix B) weighs the
seriousness of the trigger against the reasonableness of the offending party’s
conduct.264
To determine the seriousness of the offense, Feinberg looks to the
“intensity and durability of the repugnance produced”265—a fleeting nuisance
or incessant harassment? Second, he examines “the extent to which repugnance
could be anticipated to be the general reaction of strangers to the conduct
displayed or represented.”266 The greater the magnitude of dislike for the
behavior, the more serious the offense. The third factor is the extent to which
the aggrieved could have avoided the trigger.267 Finally, Feinberg would ask
whether the aggrieved willingly assumed the risk of being offended.268
In the second part of the test, Feinberg looks to the reasonableness of the
offending party’s conduct.269 This is assessed by first looking at the conduct’s
social impact, as measured by “its personal importance to the actors themselves
and its social value generally” (with deference to free speech).270 Then by
looking to “the availability of alternative times and places where the conduct in
question would cause less offense.”271 And finally, by asking “the extent, if any,
to which the offense is caused with spiteful motives” or intentionally.272
Feinberg proposes balancing the weight of the first part of the test (seriousness
of the offense) against the second set of factors (reasonableness of the offending
party’s conduct).273
One could argue that purely factual-psychological metrics like Feinberg’s
can be used to mask what should be moral judgments, making them look like
liberal decisions.274 This approach also tilts towards favoring the majority’s
263. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 573–600 (2d ed. 1955). See
generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 616–43 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)
(discussing Prosser’s tort analysis theory).
264. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Harlon L. Dalton, “Disgust” and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881, 889 n.40 (1987) (critiquing
Feinberg’s “liberal” approach as influencing “ostensibly neutral judgements”); H.J. McCloskey,
Immorality, Indecency, and the Law, VIII POL. STUD. 366, 370–71 (1965) (“And the liberal, paradoxically
if not absurdly, sums prepared to favour banning such conduct qua its being offensive, although not
qua its immorality—even though it is its immorality which makes it offensive!”).
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selected social conventions and the status quo. In philosopher Tatjana Hörnle’s
words, “[o]ne could punish relatively innocuous acts if a sufficiently large
number of persons felt offended.”275 A quantitative weighing of interests
complicates the protection of minorities: “If a racist slur is aimed at a very small
and unpopular minority, very few people are likely to be distressed.”276
Feinberg’s test incorporates tort-like reasoning and simultaneously
accounts for the complexity and nuance of offense. It limits legal moralism by
focusing on public reaction rather than the substance of the public’s objection.
It also filters out idiosyncratic conduct that offends only those with abnormal
susceptibilities. Although we can detect traces of Feinberg’s test in California’s
Miller-Hill-Hernandez trilogy of offensiveness tests, Feinberg’s model,
developed before Miller, is a clearer, more detailed, and surgical approach.
C.

Offensiveness As Outrage

Philosopher Martha Nussbaum posited that laws should not be based on
what some may find disgusting277 because disgust contains no moral wisdom, is
based on potentially mistaken social norms, and has a history of group-based
prejudice and exclusion.278 Rather, Nussbaum argues, outrage or indignation is a
more appropriate and relevant basis for legal judgment.279
Nussbaum and other leading philosophers study the role of emotion in
law.280 Because some emotions carry moral baggage, Nussbaum contends, they
are not worthy of equal dignity. Shame and disgust, for example, are dangerous
emotions that almost always fail to give “good guidance for political and legal
purposes” for two main reasons.281 First, shame and disgust are the product of
discomfort with our own animal existence and humanity in its rawest form. This
translates, among other things, into discomfort with the sexuality of women and
homosexuals.282 Unlike other emotions that focus on acts themselves, shame and
disgust are always about persons and thus have the power to deny the equal
275. Hörnle, supra note 33, at 262.
276. Id. at 262–63.
277. Professor Nussbaum couches her argument in terms of disgust, rather than using the more
generalized offensiveness.
278. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 125.
279. Nussbaum, Secret Sewers, supra note 33, at 44.
280. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (exploring
the role of emotion in law); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997) (same); THE
PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed. 1999) (same); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments
Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 733–62 (1998) (same); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998) (reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, ANATOMY OF
DISGUST (1997)); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996) (same).
281. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 122.
282. See generally James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698 (2005)
(reviewing NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33).
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dignity of others.283 Second, these emotions are a dangerous basis for legal
analysis because they are inherently hierarchical; that is, both emotions
“typically express themselves through the subordination of both individuals and
groups based on features of their way of life.”284 Their hierarchical nature is
evident in the language of disgust historically used to justify “misogyny, antiSemitism, and loathing of homosexuals.”285
Outrage or indignation, in contrast to shame and disgust, can take a bad
act as its target without denying the ultimate value of the person who
committed that act.286 In addition, outrage allows for reasoning that can be
publicly shared. We can detect iterations of an outrage test in the language of
some courts applying privacy torts, although exposition of their underlying
emotions or moral reasoning is usually absent. Professor Jordan Blanke similarly
observes that outrage is a catalyst for change in both privacy norms and
legislation.287 Indeed some privacy violations have been referred to as
outrageous,288 objectionable,289 or shocking the conscience.290
Although elaborated in the context of criminal law, Nussbaum’s body of
work serves as a critical reminder that a reasoned inquiry into the emotion
behind the offensiveness logic reveals its moral (or immoral) foundation,
bringing us a step closer to understanding its proper determination.
D.

Offensiveness As Material Harm

Criminal law scholar Louis B. Schwartz argued that conduct triggering
offense may be regulated because it does in fact cause harm—psychic harm.291
Schwartz argued that the psychic affront, however fleeting, can be equated with
physical or material harm and this forms the basis for a justification of the
prohibition of certain conduct that causes offense.292 He observed that
psychologists would likely agree that the effects of psychic harm could be more
acute than physical harm and that, as such, citizens may legitimately demand
283. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 230 (explaining that shame and
disgust operate by dismissing, rejecting, or degrading the person who is their target).
284. Id. at 321.
285. Id. at 75.
286. Id. at 166.
287. Jordan M. Blanke, Privacy and Outrage, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 9 (2018).
288. Hammer v. Sorensen, 824 F. App’x 689, 696 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Florida law);
Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Hamberger v. Eastman,
206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (“It is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency
that liability accrues.”).
289. Prosser, supra note 40, at 391.
290. Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Anderson v. City of
Becker, No. 08-5687, 2009 WL 3164769, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2009).
291. Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671–
73 (1963).
292. Id.
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that the state protect psychological, in addition to physical, well-being.293 In this
view, laws prohibiting acts that offend are justified because the offense causes
psychic harm.294
If we subscribe to offense as material harm, it stands to reason that the
yardstick for offensiveness would be the degree of the ensuing psychic harm.
Some courts, such as the jurisdictions adopting the language on intentional
infliction of emotional distress,295 focus on the degree of pain, anguish, and
mental distress likely caused as an indicator of whether its trigger is highly
offensive.296
This approach may result in an exceedingly restrictive view of privacy.
Warren and Brandeis expressed concern that privacy harms were too intangible
to be recognized as material harm.297 Privacy scholars have similarly observed
that privacy law suffers from too few “dead bodies”298 (or “at least of broken
bones and buckets of money”)299 which may prevent courts and factfinders from
understanding “the compelling ways that privacy violations can negatively
impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond simply provoking
feelings of unease.”300
E.

Offensiveness As Threat to a Legitimate Interest

Andrew von Hirsch has proposed that neither individual nor widespread
offense alone should be enough to consider an act legally objectionable.301 He
also rejects a harm-based approach: the mere fact that words or conduct cause
disliked mental states (even to most people) or infringe taboos is not enough to
justify proscription.302 Instead, von Hirsch suggests that a legitimate underlying
293. Id. at 672; see also Post, supra note 22, at 960 (defining an invasion of privacy as “an injury to
personality” that “impairs the mental peace and comfort of the individual and may produce suffering
more acute than that produced by mere bodily injury” (quoting Hamberger, 206 A.2d at 242)).
294. Schwartz, supra note 291, at 671–73; Post, supra note 22, at 967.
295. Hammer v. Sorensen, 824 F. App’x 689, 696 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Florida law);
Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Stoddard v.
Wohlfahrt, 573 So. 2d 1060, 1062–63 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991)); Hamberger, 206 A.2d 242 (“It is only where
the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.”); see also Scharf, supra note
52, at 1095 (noting courts have equated the level of offensiveness in intrusion causes with the standard
required to prove intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims).
296. Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 122–23 (W.D. Pa. 2019); McIsaac v.
WZEW–FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986); Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Pa.
1985); Roe ex rel. Roe v. Heap, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-586, 2004-Ohio-2504, ¶ 82 (citing Haller
v. Phillips, 591 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)) (holding that intrusion must be of “such a
character as would shock the ordinary person to the point of emotional distress”).
297. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 197–98 (expressing concern that privacy harms that
simply resulted in “wounded feelings” might not find redress).
298. Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 52, 52 (2007).
299. Id. at 62.
300. Id. at 52.
301. von Hirsch, The Offense Principle, supra note 229, at 79.
302. Id. at 80–82.
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reason must explicitly accompany the breach of norms. The reasons “should be
made explicit” and “be subjected to critical scrutiny” to avoid bias or unfairness
before conduct may be deemed offensive.303 Simply put, von Hirsch pleads for
an explicitly stated and justified underlying interest. The question then
becomes whether the violated interest relates to a right that requires other
people to stop their allegedly offensive interference.
The offense-plus-reason approach is alluring precisely because it is
notoriously hard to describe why certain things are offensive. Because
offensiveness hits on an emotional level first, rationality is blocked, and tying
reactions to interests without invoking morality or bias becomes a difficult, but
critical challenge.304 The mental exercise of tying visceral offense to a valid
interest and acknowledged right helps both the offended party and the actor
understand the behavior and its implications. It also guides the factfinder with
a rational appraisal to assess the relative value of those interests and rights,
irrespective of the potential bias or distraction of the offense.
F.

Offensiveness As Assault to Symbolic Value

For philosopher Andrew Sneddon, offensiveness is more than a feeling,
norm, or interest.305 He defines offensiveness as an attack on “symbolic
value,”306 which is the message sent via a symbol that pertains to values, ways
of life,307 or beliefs of well-being, rights, and character traits.308 Words that
offend, he explains, have symbolic value because they insult a way of life.309
Offense occurs because individuals have self-concerning reasons to protect and
promote symbols that make them feel good and diminish those that make them
feel bad.310 Offensive conduct or words pose a symbolic risk to an individual’s
or group’s way of life, well-being, or traits.
For Sneddon, all violations of symbolic value are offensive.311 An
offender’s motives do not factor into the equation of whether an act is offensive.
Instead, the significance of what is perceived to be offensive and the
determination as to whether a remedy should be employed turns on: (1) if the
alleged offensive act, object, utterance, etc. truly poses a symbolic risk; (2) if
the symbolic risk is significant; (3) if the way of living that is implicated can
303. Id. at 85.
304. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 36 (discussing the difficulty in giving reasons for some feelings
of offense).
305. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 14.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 142.
308. Id. at 153.
309. Id. at 152–53.
310. See id. at 152–53 (using the American flag as an example of a symbol with conflicting emotions
attached to it).
311. Id. at 180.
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continue in its present form in light of the symbolic risk; (4) if the symbolic
value or way of living that is being offended is worth preserving; (5) the
justification for the offensive act, object, utterance, etc.; (6) if the interference
with the offensive act, item, utterance, etc. eliminates the risk or provides
remedy to the offensive act; and (7) if there are other considerations that should
limit or prohibit remedial measures to address the offense.312
Sneddon’s test or scorecard, as he terms it, although well-articulated and
defended, is too esoteric for a practical-minded legal audience. It also focuses
too heavily on the aggrieved’s subjective perception of offense, a perspective
expressly rejected by the tort’s focus on the reasonable person. However,
Sneddon’s contribution is in thinking of offense as an attack on symbolic value
or a threat to a way of life. For many privacy harms, that threat is autonomy,
security, intimacy, or control over information.
Philosophers offer us various lenses with which to understand and even
test offensiveness. They challenge us to look beyond the visceral, to understand
the biases behind emotions, and not to discount offensiveness when it does not
result in palpable harm. Their work uniformly rejects a bare, blind reliance on
community standards and reminds us that the well-accepted norms of the
majority can be unjust, biased, and immoral. Instead, they seek for the
underlying risks, threats, and legitimate interests implicated to validate
offensiveness beyond the “it is what it is.” Perhaps most importantly,
philosophy offers us models for tests that distill the many relevant factors that
may contribute to offense or work to excuse it.
III. A RUBRIC FOR JUDGING OFFENSIVENESS IN PRIVACY TORTS
Informed by the critical traps we have identified and psychological and
philosophical perspectives, we now turn to the practical: creating a workable
rubric to guide decision-makers in a reasoned approach to offensiveness. The
goal is not to sway the analysis either way, but rather to elucidate assumptions,
clarify reasoning, avoid traps leading to error and bias, and make the
offensiveness inquiry more rational and transparent.
The Miller-Hill-Hernandez trilogy of factor-based tests is a good starting
point to inform the rubric.313 They are designed to identify highly offensive
conduct within the context of the intrusion tort. At their core, the three attempt
to balance the gravity of the intrusion against the defendant’s legitimate
interests. Like these courts, we recognize that context is at the heart of the
offensiveness analysis. Our rubric borrows these concepts but is specifically
designed to also address offensiveness in disclosure and false-light claims. By

312. Id. at 224–43; see infra Appendix B.
313. See infra Appendix A.
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providing more detail, our rubric identifies other relevant considerations left
vague by these tests.
In philosophy, Feinberg and Sneddon propose other offensiveness tests
that begin by gauging the seriousness of the trigger.314 Building on Feinberg’s
test, our rubric considers the intensity of the offense, the relative ease with
which the trigger could have been avoided, and the anticipated reaction of
strangers to the trigger.315 The rubric also, like Sneddon’s, looks to the risk of
harm generated by the trigger to determine its seriousness.316 Our rubric factors
the social utility of the trigger, a critical consideration in weighing its
justifiability.317
Standing on the shoulders of these courts and philosophers, we add to the
analysis by factoring in additional inquiries to avoid the frequent critical traps
revealed by our research.
A.

Rubric

This inquiry-based rubric tasks courts first with deconstructing and
understanding the privacy invasion at issue and the source of its offense and
second with judging the invasion’s offensiveness.
At the outset, let us reiterate some definitions: the trigger is the action,
matter, or implication that set off the alleged offense, the offense is the
aggrieved’s reaction to the trigger, and offensiveness is the degree to which the
offense is warranted.
The first part of the test deconstructs the offense by:
(1) identifying the trigger that must be judged as highly offensive;
(2) properly framing the offense within its context; and
(3) understanding the potential consequences of the trigger and
the ensuing offense.
The second part of the tests attempts to judge the offensiveness and
determine whether any mitigating factors justify it, by examining:
(4) the privacy interests, rights, and risks implicated by the
trigger;
(5) the reasonableness of the offense from the perspective of a
similarly situated individual;
(6) the foreseeability at the time of the offense that the trigger
would outrage strangers; and
314. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26; SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 226; see infra Appendix B.
315. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26.
316. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 226.
317. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26 (stating that the seriousness of the offense should be weighed
against the “social value” of the offending party’s conduct, “remembering always the enormous social
utility of unhampered expression”).
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(7) the trigger’s social utility.
While recognizing the practicalities of shorter tests, like the Miller-HillHernandez trilogy factor-based tests, the rubric is more expansive to ensure the
factfinder laboriously takes apart the offense, considers all relevant information,
and confronts any biases in articulating and passing judgment on the offense.
This rubric is elaborated in Part A and then put into practice in a series of
examples in Part B.
***
Deconstructing the Offense
The first three inquiries are meant to assist the court or factfinder in
understanding the nature of the offense and its potential harm. This rubric is a
step-by-step analysis aimed at deconstructing the offense at issue and the source
of its offensiveness while avoiding the critical traps discussed in Part I. The
rubric also explicitly disassociates harm from the analysis and instead looks to
the potential consequences of the offense alleged.
1. Conduct or Content? According to the elements of the tort pleaded, what is
the trigger (intrusion, matter disclosed, false light) that must be judged highly
offensive?
Our research reveals that courts sometimes analyze the offensiveness of
the wrong aspect of the plaintiff’s claim.318 This first question thus instructs the
jurist or factfinder to identify the tort at hand and ensure it is evaluating the
offensiveness of the right behavior or matter. Intrusion upon seclusion, in its
most common form as embodied in the Restatement, requires the act of
invasion itself to be offensive, not the information gleaned because of the
intrusion.319 In a public-disclosure-of-private-facts claim, it is the content of the
private matter disclosed that must be highly offensive, not how the information
was obtained. And in a false-light claim, the false light in which the plaintiff
was placed because of the publication must be offensive, not the publication
itself.
2. Context Framing: In one sentence, what is the trigger? What factor or
combination of factors could have conspired to make the trigger allegedly
offensive?
The offensiveness analysis goes invariably awry when courts or litigants
fail to properly identify and frame the trigger or source of the offense. Leaving
out relevant contextual facts, for example, causes what would otherwise be an
offensive invasion or disclosure to appear innocuous.
318. See supra Part II.A.
319. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652B.
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Decision-makers also ought to inquire about the factors—explicit or
implicit—that contributed to the offense. Sometimes seemingly innocuous
events can be elevated to highly offensive based on a combination of
contributing contextual factors. Although the privacy torts demand that the
subjective impressions of the aggrieved be put to the side, engaging in a deep
contextual analysis regarding the identities, relationships, and circumstances
around the offense allows us to properly understand whether the ensuing
composite sketch would be offensive to a reasonable person. What other factors
may be driving the conclusion of offensiveness?
The following is a non-exhaustive list of possible factors that may make a
particular action particularly offensive to a plaintiff. Factors may include:
o The identity of the offender;
o The relationship between the parties (i.e., an employer, a person or
entity with unequal bargaining power, a person with whom the plaintiff
had a relationship of trust, a doctor, a friend, etc.);320
o The relevant social identities of the offended party (i.e., their age,
gender, race, disability, sexual orientation, etc.);321
o The magnitude and duration of the offense;322
o The trigger’s foreseeability or element of surprise;
o The defendant’s intent to offend or cause harm;
o Whether the defendant engaged in deceit; or
o Whether any intimidating, belittling, threatening conduct, etc. was
present.
When a plaintiff articulates these or a court can infer them, it makes the
claimed offense, regardless of its reasonableness, more digestible. Moreover,
requiring the court and factfinder to identify the trigger in one sentence ensures
both a succinct and clear evaluation of what the plaintiff specifically has
identified as the trigger of their offense and found to be offensive. The

320. Researchers have found that the closer the relationship between the offender and offended
party, the more deeply the offense is triggered and felt. See generally Isabella Poggi & Francesca
D’Errico, Feeling Offended: A Blow to Our Image and Social Relationships, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1 (2018)
(discussing how the feeling of offense extends beyond honor and public image to close relationships
and challenges to our personal value).
321. See Post, supra note 22, at 984 (noting that because torts draw on social norms and norms are
context specific, an inquiry into offensiveness requires an inquiry into the context of a disclosure such
as: “‘[T]he social occasion,’ the purpose, timing, and status of the person who makes the disclosure, the
status and purposes of the addressee of the disclosure and so on” (citation omitted)); Sonja R. West,
The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 589, 632 (2010) (noting identity of plaintiff and other context can affect offensiveness
analysis).
322. See McClurg, supra note 22, at 1063 (noting an offense can be magnified or more offensive
depending on its magnitude, duration, and “other factors that accentuate its dimensions”).
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factfinder should then ask the same question and determine whether they would
identify the same or additional factors that contributed to the plaintiff’s offense.
It is important to note that at this point, the analysis is agnostic. We are
simply listing the situational aggravating factors that contributed to the
plaintiff’s offense, which is a critical first step. Later, we can decide whether the
factors that aggravate the plaintiff’s offense are legitimate or worth validating.
Recall the exposition of Masterpiece Cake, where Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent,
distinguished an offense based on a person’s homosexual identity from one
based on the expression of a political message.323 Similarly, in Doe v. Boyertown
Area School District,324 parents of cisgender students complained that the mere
presence of transgender students in locker rooms and bathrooms was a highly
offensive privacy intrusion.325 By deconstructing the roots of the trigger—in
this case, not conduct, but rather the gender identity of the alleged “intruder”—
the Third Circuit reached the conclusion that the presence of transgender
students was not highly offensive to a reasonable person.326
3. Consequences: Keeping in mind that actual harm is not required as an
element of the torts, what are the current and potential consequences of the type
of trigger and offense alleged?
This question asks the factfinder to consider the harmful consequences
that could have resulted from the trigger or a similar trigger to the one causing
offense in the instant case.327 For example, a Peeping Tom, illicitly peering into
his neighbor’s bedroom, could have only observed something mundane, like
vacuuming. However, he could have also observed exceedingly more private and
intimate acts. This question thus attempts to divorce the harm produced from
the potential harmfulness of the act itself. These harms may include, as
Professors Citron and Solove recently identified: physical, economic,
reputational, emotional, relationship, censoring, discriminatory, expectational,
loss of control, data quality and integrity, informational, data vulnerability,
disturbance, and autonomy harms.328
In his comprehensive analysis of offense, philosopher Joel Feinberg
classifies six clusters of offended states caused by the blamable conduct of
others: (1) affronts to the senses, or an unpleasant experience related to sound,
color, or odor (i.e., fingernails grating a chalkboard); (2) disgust and revulsion,
323. See supra text accompanying notes 109–10.
324. 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018).
325. Id. at 525.
326. Id. at 537.
327. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” supra note 135, at 769 (observing struggles ensuing in
recognizing privacy harms that do not result in embarrassment, humiliation, or physical or
psychological injury).
328. Citron & Solove, supra note 128, at 831.
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which involves a higher order recognition that the subject is wrong or
inappropriate (i.e., a person eating a putrid slug); (3) shock to moral, religious,
or patriotic sensibilities (i.e., burning a cross or flag); (4) shame,
embarrassment, and anxiety (i.e., unconsented-to circulation of nude pictures
of oneself); (5) annoyance, boredom, and frustration (i.e., incessant robocalls);
and (6) fear, resentment, humiliation, and anger (i.e., threats, taunting, and
contemptuous mockery).329 By classifying the offense within the offended
clusters, we gain further understanding of the offense and its potential
consequences.
This prong of the rubric recognizes that privacy harms matter regardless
of whether the plaintiff can demonstrate a tangible injury.330 And, similar to
Sneddon’s scorecard, it directs the factfinder to look not just to the harm caused
by the trigger, but to the risk the trigger poses to an individual’s way of life or
rights.331 In many instances, the harm is decipherably manifested because it
causes either observable physical or psychic harm, such as mental anguish or
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation. But in other instances, it may instead
increase the likelihood of eventual harm, such as the potential use of the
aggregation of private data.
This inquiry, like Feinberg’s offense principle, also requires the factfinder
to consider the intensity and durability of the potential consequences.
Judging the Offense
Upon understanding the trigger, the plaintiff’s offense, and the trigger’s
potentially harmful effects, the factfinder is better equipped to judge the
trigger’s offensiveness. This necessarily involves an identification and
evaluation of the rights implicated, a mindful assessment of the reasonableness
of the offense, a consideration of the outraged reaction of strangers, and, finally,
a potentially forgiving look at the trigger’s social utility. Throughout, we frame
questions to serve as checks and balances on potentially encroaching biases.
4. Rights: What interest or right did the trigger impinge?
The work of Andrew von Hirsch reminds us to make explicit a legitimate
underlying interest implicated by any breach of social norms.332 In evaluating
offensiveness, it is important to understand what legitimate right(s) and/or
interest(s) of the aggrieved have been impinged by the trigger or the offense.
To be clear, the offense itself, at a minimum, will always implicate the
aggrieved’s interest in being free from bad feelings. But this is not, on its own
329.
330.
331.
332.

FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 10–13.
Post, supra note 22, at 964–67.
SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 224–43 (looking to symbolic risk and its extent).
von Hirsch, The Offense Principle, supra note 229, at 85.
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without more, an interest that tort law can remedy. As we have established,
anything you do can subjectively elicit bad feelings in me.
Instead, we analyze the trigger. This involves a two-part inquiry that first
seeks to identify the moral or political interests that are implicated and then
assesses their legitimacy. Some legitimate privacy interests include autonomy,
honor, identity, safety, mental health and welfare, intimacy, exposure, and
dignity. Less legitimate interests or ones that should not weigh heavily in favor
of the plaintiff as a matter of public policy might include a desire to silence
public information, hide misconduct in the workplace, impose a personal
worldview on others, or maintain economic privilege.
5. Reasonableness: Putting yourself in the place of a similarly situated
plaintiff, could the offense be reasonable?
Now we turn to the reasonableness of the offense, with a twist. Much has
been written about the inherent subjectivity of offensiveness, which the law
rejects. In privacy tort law, requiring the offense to be reasonable filters out
personal idiosyncrasies, sensitivities, and fleeting discomfort in favor of what is
socially recognized as an offense and thus warranted.333 As Prosser put it, “[t]he
law of privacy is not intended for the protection of any shrinking soul who is
abnormally sensitive.”334 But judging the reasonableness of offensiveness, like
outrage, can be subject to the perception of privileged decision-makers.335
Indeed, Prosser found no cause for outrage when men advanced explicit and
even vulgar solicitations to have sex, which he classified as nothing more than
an “annoyance[],” not capable of causing severe distress.336
Assessing reasonableness is rife for potential bias. Often, particularly when
applying the reasonable man standard, courts seem to overlook the trigger’s
potential offense to a similarly situated plaintiff.337 Penthouse magazine
333. See Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a Google
StreetView vehicle entering onto an ungated driveway and photographing the property was not
offensive because “[n]o person of ordinary sensibilities would be shamed, humiliated, or have suffered
mentally as a result”); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652B, cmt. d (“Thus there is no liability
for knocking at the plaintiff’s door.”).
334. Prosser, supra note 40, at 397.
335. Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage, supra note 30, at 2122–23 (noting that courts applying
the outrageousness prong of the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort were historically
inclined to protect male and white privilege, refusing to find sexual harassment or discriminatory
treatment as outrageous).
336. Id. at 2155 (quoting William Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874, 888 (1939)).
337. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–
25 (1988) (noting the “reasonable man” standard, which later evolved to the “reasonable person”
standard, has its roots in a legal system and culture that is focused on male-centered norms that does
not recognize women as reasonable and arguing the standard should change to one of adequate care);
Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 41, 57–65 (1989) (discussing persisting gender bias in the “reasonable person” standard).
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published a picture of a group of tween girls under the title “Little Amazons
Attack Boys,” suggesting they were masculine and aggressive in nature.338 When
their parents objected to the false light and their young daughters’ appearance
in an oversexualized magazine, the court concluded that the characterization
could not possibly “be objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the
circumstances.”339 In the name of objectivity and reasonableness, we cannot
abandon those in the minority, who are often disproportionately affected by
privacy harms.
Acknowledging that we cannot eliminate personal or structural bias with
a certainty, we propose a mental model of reframing the question to reduce it
where possible. This part of the analysis is meant to place the factfinder in the
position of the offended party. To avoid exercising judgment that “is divorced
from its context,” one noted jurist has suggested that courts should assess
whether reasonable similarly situated plaintiffs would find the trigger
offensive.340 Studies have shown that one of the most effective ways to “debias”
people is to induce participants to create a mental model to actively consider
alternative perspectives, arguments, and conclusions.341 Taking a different
perspective forces the arbiters to articulate in a conscious manner the
assumptions they would otherwise silently, unknowingly, or implicitly make,
while respecting the elements of the tort.342

338. Fudge v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988).
339. Id. at 1019 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting tit. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-1-28.1(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw through 2022 Legis. Sess.)); see also IMM Publ’ns, Inc. v. Lamar
Obie Corp., No. CV 09-937-PK, 2010 WL 1838654, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 09-937-PK, 2010 WL 1838619 (D. Or. May 6, 2010) (noting court would
consider the reasonable person, not the reasonable minority business owner and advocate’s
interpretation of whether the publicity was highly offensive).
340. Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC (HL) 457, [¶¶ 98–99] (UK); see also
Tigran Palyan, Comment, Common Law Privacy in a Not So Common World: Prospects for the Tort of
Intrusion upon Seclusion in Virtual Worlds, 38 SW. L. REV. 167, 189–90 (2008) (arguing the reasonable
avatar standard should be applied for intrusion claims in virtual worlds to properly gauge the
offensiveness of the alleged conduct).
341. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 511, 543–44 (2004).
342. See Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #Me Too Moment?, 11 J. TORT L. 39, 44 (2018)
(expressing hope tort law will have a #MeToo moment that will cause the common law to disrupt,
rather than reinforce, gender inequality); Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 30, at 466 (noting
that gender and racial bias make their way into the law not explicitly, but rather by the privileged
majority’s reliance on implicit hierarchies of values); Lidsky, supra note 157, at 48 (noting the real
problem is that judges make “value choices . . . in an unreflective manner, based on assumptions about
community life presumed to be so common they need not be stated”); Banks, supra note 30, at 443
(noting the undiscussed prejudicial impact of race, culture, class, and gender in tort cases).
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6. Reaction: To what extent could it be anticipated, at the time of the offense,
that the reaction of strangers to the trigger would be one of outrage? Why?
Joel Feinberg, Martha Nussbaum, Andrew von Hirsch, and others have
put forth compelling arguments against a bare appeal to community mores as a
basis for finding offensiveness. We all know norms can be mistaken,
indeterminate, fluid, and even immoral.343 And the offensiveness analysis
cannot be stripped of its inherently normative roots. However, it is not the role
of the judiciary to invent norms, but rather to interpret the sense of the
community in an honest and just manner, with as much clarity as possible.
Examining the reaction of strangers is Feinberg’s barometer for social
norms. Feinberg argues that the use of widespread affront is a better indicator
because it reflects community standards while limiting legal moralism.344 Our
Question 6 borrows this notion from Feinberg while replacing his language of
“repugnance”345 with Nussbaum’s carefully considered metric for offensiveness:
outrage. As discussed in Part II, Nussbaum warns of the use of emotions, such
as shame, disgust, and repugnance, as a basis for law because they carry moral
baggage without moral reasoning. Outrage, in contrast, as we see in some
iterations of offensiveness analyses, is expressly justifiable. Professor Cass
Sunstein proposes that judicial humility requires courts to be sensitive to
community outrage.346 Such humility counsels that when a decision could
foreseeably provoke such outrage, which functions as a corrective heuristic, it is
at least an indication that the decision might be wrong.347 Professors Kahan,
Hoffman, and Braman argue humility also requires courts to consider whether
privileging their own “obvious” views sends a discriminatory message to
outraged members of minority communities.348
This question asks judges to engage in a narrower mental exercise
compared to a straightforward normative question. It enlists the perceived
wisdom of the crowd. At later stages in litigation, objective criteria could be
invoked as evidence of widely held reactions, which are slightly more
measurable than beliefs and values. Objective criteria might include surveys,

343. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 33, at 33; Camille A. Nelson, Considering
Tortious Racism, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 905, 959 (2005) (noting that torts may cause greater
psychic harms to racial minorities subjected to constant racism).
344. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 14; see also Blanke, supra note 287, at 9 (noting public outrage
shapes new privacy norms).
345. See infra Appendix A.
346. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 155, 155 (2007).
347. Id. at 175–78.
348. Kahan et al., supra note 30, at 899.
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news stories, studies, similar suits filed where others have alleged the same or
similar conduct or content to be offensive, expert testimony or reports, etc.349
On the other hand, if strangers do not have a uniform or clear hypothetical
reaction of outrage, or if the arbiter does not have enough information to
imagine a result due to incipient norms, the matter should be left to a jury to
decide. The jury can then consider evidence, such as expert reports, surveys,
and other data otherwise unavailable at the pleading stage.
7. Recalibrating: What is the social utility of the trigger and how does it
measure against the plaintiff’s privacy?
Finally, the factfinder is tasked with weighing the trigger’s social utility
against the plaintiff’s privacy interests.350 While this balancing of interests is
not a novel concept,351 courts often overlook the plaintiff’s interest when the
defendant can muster a non-nefarious motive for the trigger. The current Miller
and Hernandez offensiveness tests instruct courts to narrowly focus on the
defendant’s motives, objectives, and justifications.352 But while a defendant’s
motives may factor into a trigger’s social utility, they are not dispositive. It
could also be that a defendant has spiteful motives, but the triggering conduct
promotes social utility or that a defendant has noble motives, but the trigger
does not promote social utility. This final question thus takes the broader
approach embodied in Feinberg’s test and Sneddon’s scorecard that look
respectively to the trigger’s social value353 and positive considerations.354
349. This evidence, however, is often difficult to gather, and putting the burden on the plaintiff to
present it at the pleading stage far exceeds the federal and state pleading standards, which only require
a plaintiff to make a short and plain statement of the claim that demonstrates he or she is entitled to
relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(b); see also Lidsky, supra note 157, at 7 (noting
courts rarely resort to objective criteria such as polls or surveys and instead rely on their visceral feelings
and common sense in determining community norms).
350. See Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” supra note 135, at 763 (noting that “[p]rivacy issues
involve balancing societal interests on both sides of the scale”).
351. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1235 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The public has
a legitimate interest in sexuality, but that interest may be outweighed in such a case by the injury to
the sensibilities of the persons made use of by the author in such a way.”); Solove, Virtues of Knowing
Less, supra note 158, at 1058–59 (proposing a balancing approach that weighs the value of the plaintiff’s
interest against the “value of the use of the information in the context in which it is disclosed”);
Strahilevitz, supra note 115, at 2032 (observing that Posner, Warren, and Brandeis insert a welfarist
balancing test on offensiveness that asks whether “the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff’s privacy
interest [is] outweighed by a paramount public policy interest”); Sprague, supra note 43, at 126
(balancing the likelihood of serious harm to the victim with the countervailing interests of the
defendant based on competing social norms); West, supra note 321, at 629–31 (noting offensiveness
prong should “examine the purpose of the disclosure and discern whether the reason for the disclosure
was of such minimal social or personal value that it does not justify the harm it has caused”).
352. See Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 P.3d 1063, 1080 (Cal. 2009); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co.,
232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
353. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26.
354. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 226.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2022)

1608

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Social utility is not limited to the defendant’s motives. It recognizes
legitimate public interests in First Amendment rights of speech and access to
information and an employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining a safe, drug
and harassment free work environment, etc. But identifying these as promoting
social utility is not the end of the inquiry. Social utility also implicates
legitimate public interests in discouraging certain triggering offenses and
protecting the public and individuals from the same. The overall social utility
of the trigger must then be weighed against the individual rights and interests
of the plaintiff identified in Question 4. Recalibrating prevents the trigger’s
social utility from being considered in a vacuum to determine its offensiveness.
In making this determination, the factfinder should consider whether the same
social utility could be achieved without the triggering offense or at a time, place,
or manner that would have minimized or eliminated the offense.355
In addition to assisting the judiciary in determining whether, as a matter
of law, the conduct or disclosure at issue could be highly offensive, this rubric
also aids plaintiffs to plead their privacy tort claims in a clearer way. Moreover,
the rubric can be tailored as jury instructions to assist the factfinder in
concluding whether the privacy invasion is sufficiently offensive under the
reasonable person standard. Outside the legal process, the rubric is applicable
to decision-makers wishing to clarify the legitimacy of offensiveness complaints
across contexts.
B.

Testing the Rubric: Three Sample Cases

Applying the rubric to distinct fact patterns illustrates how its various
inquiries can help courts tackle the privacy torts’ offensiveness analysis. The
three illustrations below are loosely based on documented cases, where courts,
faced with similar scant factual allegations, were tasked with determining
whether the trigger was sufficiently offensive to survive dismissal and proceed
to a jury.
Illustration 1: Intruding Ex
Upon learning that his ex-wife Ashley is in a relationship with another
woman named Valeria, Michael files a motion in family court to gain custody
of the former couple’s six-year-old daughter. To obtain proof of Ashley’s
relationship, Michael surreptitiously enters her property, perches himself
outside the master bedroom, and records Ashley and Valeria having sex. He
submits the video to the family court as evidence that Ashley is an unfit
mother—and wins. Upon learning of the video, Valeria feels angry, shamed,
and violated by the furtive act. She suffers constant anxiety and insecurity at
355. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26 (considering “the availability of alternative times and places
where the conduct in question would cause less offense”).
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the thought that someone might be surveilling her at any moment. Valeria sues
Michael, claiming intrusion upon seclusion.356
1. Conduct or Content?: In cases of intrusion upon seclusion, the court must
find the conduct of the intrusion to be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Since Valeria is not suing for public disclosure of private facts, the content of
the video does not have to be analyzed.
2. Context Framing: Defendant trespassed to secretly peer through
plaintiff’s bedroom window and film her and her partner naked, having sex.
Factors that could have potentially aggravated the offense include its setting: a
bedroom in a private dwelling, the intimate conduct plaintiff was engaged in
during the intrusion, the plaintiff’s vulnerable, naked state, the identity of the
defendant as her lover’s ex, his motives for spying and taking the picture,
plaintiff’s element of surprise and lack of awareness of his presence, and the
defendant’s implication that the women’s sexuality affected Ashley’s fitness as
a mother.
3. Consequence: Plaintiff suffered anxiety and lived with incessant unease
that she might be surveilled. The fact that the recording exists also presents a
risk of further harm, should it be further disseminated.
4. Rights: Plaintiff’s right to seclusion, security, dignity, and intimacy were
invaded.
5. Reasonableness: Most reasonable people—men and women alike—would
object to being secretly filmed while having sex.
6. Reaction: Would strangers react with outrage at the notion of being
surreptitiously filmed while having sex? Given the vast majority of case law and
examples from the Restatement that suggest a person is most entitled to
seclusion in their own private residence and when engaging in private, intimate
acts, it is foreseeable that most strangers would be outraged.
7. Recalibrating: The defendant’s motives in gaining custody of his minor
child, however rationalized, do not absolve his conduct of trespassing and
intrusion into a private dwelling and bedroom. Nothing in the fact pattern
suggests that this is a matter of public concern. Ashley’s conduct was not illegal
and there is no indication that the child was endangered by her mother’s actions.
Moreover, the defendant could have sought evidence about his wife’s fitness as
a mother through proper channels of discovery.
Based on the analysis above, the defendant’s conduct could be deemed
highly offensive to a reasonable person.

356. Based on Plaxico v. Michaels, 96-CA-00791-SCT, 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999) (en banc).
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Illustration 2: Triggering Triggers
Jasmine purchases an Alfred smart device manufactured by Smart
Electronics for her home. Upon calling out the trigger name “Alfred,” the
device performs specified commands, which include operating smart lights,
changing the room temperature, and performing simple internet searches.
Unbeknownst to Jasmine, the smart device is constantly recording sounds and
conversations, not just trigger commands. Alfred’s lengthy manual and privacy
policy indicate that the device may be actively listening and recording to
improve the smart device’s technology. Upon learning of this surveillance
functionality from an alarming news article, Jasmine is outraged and worried
about the content of Alfred’s recordings. She files suit, along with other
purchasers of the device, against Smart Electronics. Smart Electronics moves
to dismiss the case. It argues that the Alfred’s listening and recording cannot
possibly be deemed highly offensive because the information collected is only
analyzed by automated machines and the practice is common in the industry.357
1. Conduct or Content: The intruding conduct must be analyzed, not the
content of the conversations, noises, or silences surveilled and recorded.
2. Contextual Framing: Defendant’s intrusion consists of listening to and
recording all the plaintiff’s conversations and sounds. Factors that could have
potentially aggravated the offense include the location of the recording
(plaintiff’s home) and the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge and control over the
recordings. The court may want to know how often the Alfred was recording,
whether the recordings are deleted after being analyzed by a machine, and the
location of the Alfred in the plaintiff’s home, etc.
3. Consequence: Plaintiff’s conversations, sounds, noises, and silences have
been recorded and are being preserved in some format for an unknown period
of time. It is unknown how Smart Electronics will later use this information,
though it claims it is currently only being examined by computers. It is also
unknown what conversations, noises, sounds, and silences remain recorded.
These recordings could also later be shared with or sold to other third parties.
Depending on the identity of those third parties and their use, the recordings
could cause further harm.
4. Rights: Plaintiff’s right to seclusion, security, control, and intimacy were
invaded.
5. Reasonableness: Most reasonable people—women and men, purchasers
and non-purchasers of the Alfred—would object to being secretly recorded.
6. Reaction: Would strangers be outraged at the notion of a constantly
recording listening device in their homes? Given the news article’s alarming
tone regarding the practice, the fact that the intrusion occurred in the plaintiff’s
357. Based on In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F.Supp.3d 797 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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home, and the plaintiff’s and other consumers’ complaints, it is foreseeable that
the intrusion could be highly offensive. If, however, this is, as the defendant
claims, a routine commercial practice that everyone in the industry uses and
consumers are generally aware these devices constantly listen in and record
conversations, it is possible strangers might not be outraged. It is also unclear
how strangers might react to the recordings being analyzed only by a machine,
as opposed to human beings. Considering the technology’s burgeoning state,
the plaintiff’s potential complaint, and the developing social norms surrounding
such technology, it is difficult to gauge the reaction of strangers at the time of
the intrusion without more data and evidence.
7. Recalibrating: Defendant claims to be using the Alfred to listen and
record plaintiff and other consumers for legitimate business reasons—to
improve the quality and effectiveness of its product. Do these commercial
motives justify the degree of the intrusion into plaintiff’s home, conversations,
noises, and silences and trump her rights to seclusion, intimacy, and security?
Could the defendant have improved the quality and effectiveness of its product
through other, less intrusive means? Is the public best served by allowing smart
device manufacturers to continue such business practices?
Given the nascent nature of the technology and the inability to determine
the reaction of strangers, whether the intrusion is highly offensive or not should
be developed by more evidence than is available at the dismissal stage and
should ultimately be determined by a jury.
Illustration 3: Debts and Diagnosis
Guillermo’s son, Felipe, was born with cryptorchidism, a condition
affecting the testicles. When Felipe was seven, he had a successful surgery to
correct the issue at Mammoth Pediatric Hospital (“Mammoth”). Although
most of the cost of the surgery was covered by Guillermo’s insurance, Guillermo
could not pay the additional $8,398.54 in charges not covered by his insurance.
Subsequently, the hospital transferred the debt to Priority Collection Services
(“Priority”). To collect the debt, Priority partnered with various third-party
vendors, who generated collection letters. Priority electronically sent the
following information: Guillermo’s full name, address, status as a debtor, the
$8,398.54 owed, the procedure to correct Felipe’s cryptorchidism diagnosis, and
Felipe’s full name. One of the vendors subsequently sent Guillermo a
“dunning” letter that included all of this information. After the mail-person
misdelivered the letter, a nosy neighbor opened it, read it, and revealed his
discovery to Guillermo. Guillermo was ashamed and feared that the disclosure
will cause Felipe to suffer from shame, depression, low self-esteem, or other
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issues. Guillermo sued Priority for public disclosure of private facts on behalf
of himself and his minor son Felipe.358
1. Conduct or Content?: In cases of public disclosure of private facts, the
court must find the matter publicized to be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. Since Guillermo is not suing for intrusion upon seclusion, the manner
in which the information was obtained by the defendant is not relevant.
2. Context Framing: Priority disclosed to various third-party companies
that Guillermo owed a sizeable amount of money to Mammoth resulting from
Felipe’s surgery to repair cryptorchidism. Factors that could potentially have
aggravated Guillermo’s offense include the sensitive and potentially
embarrassing nature of his son’s medical condition and treatment and the fact
that sensitive information about a minor was shared. Furthermore, it does not
seem necessary to have included Felipe’s treatment or condition in the letter to
notify Guillermo of the debt and attempt to collect on the same.
3. Consequence: Plaintiff suffered emotional stress and fears the potential
of future revelations. The fact that this information is now being stored
electronically by multiple companies, which at least some employees also have
access to, makes it more likely that it could be further disseminated. It has
already been accidentally disseminated to Guillermo’s neighbor, which caused
Guillermo mental anguish. Further disclosure, or potential therefor, could be
damaging to both Guillermo and his son’s mental health and his son’s intimacy.
4. Rights: Plaintiffs’ right to dignity, ability to control the destination of
sensitive financial and medical information, mental health, and honor were
implicated because of Priority’s disclosures.
5. Reasonableness: Most reasonable people would object to having
extensive information shared about their financial indebtedness and would
strongly object to having information disclosed about a potentially embarrassing
medical condition and treatment of the same. And most reasonable people—
parents and non-parents alike—would not want a minor child’s medical
information shared without consent.
6. Reaction: Would strangers react with outrage at the notion of having
their debt, source of debt, and child’s urological medical condition disclosed?
The vast majority of case law and examples from the Restatement suggest it
would be offensive to have certain embarrassing financial and medical
information disclosed.359 It is unclear whether the disclosure to certain third358. Based on Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir.
2021), opinion vacated and superseded on rehearing, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021), rehearing en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 17 F. 4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
359. See, e.g., Johnson v. K mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding
disclosure of employee’s health problems the kind of information the disclosure of which would be
highly offensive); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding
disclosure of plaintiff’s mastectomy highly offensive); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 652D,
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party employees of Guillermo’s indebtedness is enough to foresee outrage in
strangers, but certainly it would be foreseeable that strangers would be outraged
by the disclosure of a minor child’s medical condition and surgery, particularly
one involving genitals.
7. Recalibrating: Although Priority’s motives are valid (recovering a debt),
it neither required nor justified disclosing a minor’s diagnosis or the nature of
the medical procedure. Moreover, nothing in the fact pattern suggests that this
is a matter of public concern.
Based on the analysis above, Priority’s disclosures of Guillermo’s son’s
diagnosis and the nature of his medical procedure were highly offensive, but it
is unclear whether Priority’s disclosure of Guillermo’s indebtedness status and
the amount of debt would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, given its
disclosure was limited to those who needed the information to generate a letter.
The issue should thus be decided by a jury.
CONCLUSION
As philosopher Andrew Sneddon put it, “[t]o be offensive is not to cause
offense but to warrant it.”360 The analysis of offensiveness is a black hole in
privacy law. Mostly determined without exposition, it is at once inherently
subjective yet measured by reasonableness, contextual yet generalized. Its
determination requires an imaginative leap into the time, place, and
consciousness of the public at large, amid shifting normative sands and illdefined communities. At best, this disorder results in unexplained precedents;
at worst, it may render premature, incorrect, or biased results that further
disenfranchise already stigmatized and underprivileged victims. In privacy,
rapidly evolving social norms, technologies, and related business practices
further blur the offensiveness analysis. As of yet, no test or set of principles
other than a cacophony of adjectives and generalized factors guides courts in
their inquiry.
By carefully analyzing the current doctrinal landscape, we diagnosed
critical traps inherent to the offensiveness analysis. It is our hope that courts,
litigants, and other decision-makers heed our warning and become attentive to
the concept’s propensity to confound in cognizable ways. Next, we drew from
philosophy, where offense and offensiveness have long been studied, for a better
understanding of the offensiveness analysis. Philosophers offer us principles
and definitional lenses with which to organize offensiveness while avoiding
systemic injustice and legal error.

cmt. b, illus. 7 (example of publication of photograph taken of medical condition of plaintiff’s child was
highly offensive).
360. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 14.
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Borrowing these concepts and schemas, we proposed a practical-minded
rubric to guide decision-makers. Each element of the rubric is designed to
divorce the analysis from its critical traps and biases, while staying true to the
spirit and letter of the privacy torts. More than ever, amid rapid social change
and offensiveness outcries, our society craves rational guides to analyze the
enigma that is offensiveness. Moral and social progress, as well as privacy,
depend on it.
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APPENDIX A
Frameworks from Law
The Miller v. National Broadcasting Company Factors
To determine offensiveness, courts should consider:
(1) the degree of intrusion;
(2) the context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding the intrusion;
(3) the intruder’s motives and objectives;
(4) the setting into which the intrusion occurs; and
(5) the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.361
The Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association Balancing Test
In addition to the Miller factors, courts should balance:
(1) the likelihood of serious harm, particularly to the emotional
sensibilities of the plaintiff, against
(2) any countervailing interests based on competing social norms that
may render the defendant’s conduct inoffensive, such as a legitimate
public interest in exposing serious crime.362
The Hernandez v. Hillsides Balancing Test
To determine offensiveness, courts should balance:
(1) the degree and setting of the intrusion, which includes the place, time,
and scope of the defendant’s intrusion, against
(2) the defendants’ motives, justifications, and related issues.363

361. Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
362. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647–48 (Cal. 1994).
363. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1079 (Cal. 2009).
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APPENDIX B
Frameworks from Philosophy
Joel Feinberg’s Offensiveness Test
The seriousness of the offense should be determined by:
(1) the intensity and durability of the repugnance produced, and the
extent to which repugnance could be anticipated to be the general
reaction of strangers to the conduct displayed or represented (conduct
offensive only to persons with an abnormal susceptibility to offense
could not count as very offensive);
(2) the ease with which unwilling witnesses can avoid the offensive
displays; and
(3) whether or not the witnesses have willingly assumed the risk of being
offended.
These factors should be weighed as a group against the reasonableness of the
offending party’s conduct as determined by:
(1) its personal importance to the actors themselves and its social value
generally, remembering always the enormous social utility of
unhampered expression in those cases where expression is involved;
(2) the availability of alternative times in places where the conduct in
question would cause less offense; and
(3) the extent, if any, to which the offense is caused with spiteful
motives.
Most factors can vary in degree or weight, not in absolutes.364
Andrew Sneddon’s Offensiveness Scorecard
a) Is there really a symbolic risk/insult in this act/object/utterance/etc.?
b) What is the extent of the symbolic risk/insult?
c) Can the way of living in question continue in anything like its
current form under the present circumstances (assuming that all ways of
living are somewhat flexible due to the interpretive contributions of the
people who instantiate them)?
d) Is the way of living in question worth continuing in its current form?
e) What considerations, if any, count in favor of the offensive
act/item/utterance/etc.?

364. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 26–27.
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f) Will interference with the offensive act/item/utterance/etc. remove the
risk; will redress for the offensive thing/behavior adequately rectify the
insult?
g) Do other values limit or prohibit the performance of feasible
measures to address the offensive risk/insult?365

365. SNEDDON, supra note 12, at 224–43.
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APPENDIX C
Part I: Deconstructing the Offense
CONTENT

According to the elements
of the tort pleaded, what is
the trigger that must be
judged highly offensive?

Intrusion upon seclusion: act of
intrusion
Public disclosure: content of the
private matter disclosed
False light: false light in which the
plaintiff was placed

CONTEXT
FRAMING

In one sentence, what is the
trigger? What factor or
combination of factors
conspired to make the
invasion offensive?

Identity of the offender
Relationship between the parties
Relevant social identities of the
offended party
Magnitude and duration of the
offense
Trigger’s foreseeability or element
of surprise
Defendant’s intent to offend or
cause harm
Defendant’s use of deceit
Intimidating, belittling,
threatening conduct

CONSE-

Keeping in mind that
actual harm is not required
as an element of the torts,
what are the current and
potential consequences of
the trigger alleged?

OR
CONDUCT?

QUENCES
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Part II: Judging the Offense
RIGHTS

What interest or right did the
trigger impinge?

REASONABLE
-NESS

Putting yourself in the place
of a similarly situated
plaintiff, could the offense be
reasonable?

REACTION

To what extent could it be
anticipated, at the time of the
offense, that the reaction of
strangers would be one of
outrage to trigger and why?

RECALIBRAT
-ING

What is the social utility of
the trigger and how does it
measure against the plaintiff’s
privacy?

Autonomy? Intimacy?
Identity? Dignity? Others?

Does the public or defendant
have countervailing rights,
such as freedom of speech or
access to information?
Does defendant have
justifying motives and does
the trigger serve the public
interest?
Could the countervailing
interest have been satisfied
through other less invasive
means?
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